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COMMENTS
Garnishment in Louisiana'
IN GENERAL

Before judgment can be obtained in a suit, plaintiff may
deem it advisable to procure the issuance of conservatory writs
in order to preserve defendant's property so that when judgment against defendant is obtained, assets will be available out
1. At the time of this writing the Louisiana State Law Institute is preparing
a projet for a new code of practice pursuant to a mandate from the Legislature
in Act 335 of 1948. Although work is still in progress, the Institute's proposed
revision of those segments of Louisiana practice dealing with provisional remedies
and the execution of judgments has been completed. This Comment includes within
its scope treatment of the law of garnishment under the Code of Practice of 1870
and in addition indicates the proposed changes in the law of garnishment prepared
by the Law Institute.
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of which the judgment may be satisfied. Thus, under a writ of
attachment, or a writ of sequestration, and without recourse to
garnishment proceedings, plaintiff may cause the seizure of
property or credits 2 belonging to defendant whether the property
is found in defendant's possession, or in the hands of a third person. 3 Similarly, when a money judgment has been obtained
which is not paid, the judgment creditor will be prompted to procure the issuance of a writ of fieri facias under which defendant's property can be seized wherever it may be found, and ap4
plied toward the satisfaction of the judgment.
While defendant's property and credits may be effectively

seized in the hands of a third person by the use of writs of attachment, sequestration, or fieri facias without more, such prac-

tice nevertheless leaves much to be desired. Under this procedure, for example, plaintiff must often wait a month or longer
before he can know whether there has been a successful seizure

of defendant's property, and before he can know whether that
amount of defendant's property which is successfully seized is
sufficient to satisfy a contemplated or rendered judgment.5 By
the same token, under this practice plaintiff cannot be certain
2. In Section 256 of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870 "property" Is
alluded to as consisting of "goods, effects, rights, credits, or right of actions." Such
a definition includes both the corporeal and the incorporeal property of defendant.
In view of the popular use of the term "property" to refer only to corporeal property the phrase "property" or credits is frequently used in this Comment as a
reminder that incorporeal rights may also be garnished. Perhaps the most frequent use of garnishment is to seize the incorporeal rights such as money owed
another, e.g., garnishment of a bank account, or the garnishment of earnings owed
defendant by his employer.
3. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 241 et seq., art. 269 et seq. (1870).
4. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 641 et seq. (1870).
5. This may be illustrated by the case where the property seized does not belong
to defendant, but instead is owned by another. Under such circumstances it is
possible that plaintiff would not discover until long after the property had been
sold that he had not in fact seized property belonging to defendant. The real
owner need not inform plaintiff of his error unless he wishes to do so, for the
owner is amply protected under the law. If the owner wishes he may remain
silent until after the seized property is sold under judicial process and then simply
institute an action against the sheriff and the seizing creditor for damages. Duperon
v. Van Wickle, 4 Rob. 39, 39 Am. Dec. 509 (La. 1843). This is not the only
remedy of the real owner, however. He might choose to wait until just before the
sale of the property and then institute a third opposition. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE
art. 396 et seq. (1870). In this regard see also id. arts. 298(7), 299, 399, and 400.
A third possible course of action is open to the owner. Any time before the actual
sale of the property the owner might execute a "third party affidavit" setting out
the acquisition and ownership of the property seized, thus forcing the sheriff to
call upon the seizing creditor to furnish an indemnity bond to protect the sheriff
against damages for an illegal seizure and sale. LA. R.S. 13:3869 (1950). In a
large number of cases this effects a return of property. It is thus seen that plaintiff might be completely deceived as to the amount of defendant's property he has
successfully seized, and cannot know whether he is adequately protecting his
rights, or adequately providing a fund from which his judgment can be satisfied.
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that the property and credits which he has caused to be seized
belong to defendant, and thus plaintiff incurs the risk of damages for wrongful seizure should it later develop that the property in fact belongs to another. 6
In order to overcome the shortcomings attendant to proceeding solely on the basis of a writ of attachment or fieri facias to
effect a seizure of defendant's property and credits which lie in
the hands of a third person, provision is made in the Code of
Practice to implement the effectiveness of these writs by the use
of garnishment process. By the use of garnishment proceedings
in connection with a writ of attachment or fieri facias, plaintiff
may cause third persons to be cited to answer under oath detailed interrogatories concerning any property or credits in their
7
possession or under their control which belong to defendant.
The third person thus cited is named the garnishee, who must,
within the delay for answering in ordinary suits, clearly and
categorically answer the interrogatories propounded.8 Neglect
or refusal of the garnishee to answer may subject him to liability to plaintiff for the full amount which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant.9 If the plaintiff has grounds to believe
that the answers of the garnishee are false, he may traverse the
garnishee's answers and prove that the latter does have property in his possession belonging to the defendant. 10 'Thus, by the
use of garnishment proceedings in connection with a writ of attachment or fieri facias, plaintiff is normally apprised of the
status of his seizures within a period of two weeks. Furthermore, under garnishment proceedings plaintiff usually does not
incur the risk of liability in damages for wrongful seizure of
another's property. While seizure of defendant's property in the
garnishee's possession is effective as of the moment of service
of the interrogatories, if the garnishee in fact has no property
belonging to defendant, no seizure has taken place. These and
other principles of the garnishment process will be more fully
treated hereafter. 1
6. Shexnayder v. Carter Packet Co., 132 La. 293, 61 So. 379 (1913) ; Batte v.
Reed, Manning's Unreported Cases 833 (La. 1877-1880) ; Duperon v. Van Wickle,
4 Rob. 39, 39 Am. Dec. 509 (La. 1843).
7. See page 468 infra.
& See page 468 infra.
9. See page 494 4nft-a.
10. See page 499 infra.
11. Under some circumstances -it is unnecessary to use garnishment process
since ,under the action taken against the defendant the plaintiff is already entitled
to receive from third persons the property in their hands belonging ito defendant.
For example, suppose co-defendant a owes co-defendant B a sum of money suf-
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It is to be noted that the use of garnishment proceedings in
connection with the available writs is optional and that plaintiff
may effect seizure of defendant's property in the hands of a third
person under one of several writs without the use of garnishment process. 12 In view of the advantages derived from the, use
of the garnishment process, however, this is seldom done.
Origin
The historic source from which a segment of the law is derived is sometimes considered in interpreting the provisions of
the Code. The practice Of pursuing the property of a debtor in
the hands of a third person probably had its origin in the trading
centers of England, 3 especially in the "Custom of London." A
ficient to pay the judgment against them. In an attempt to collect the entire
judgment from B it has been held that the judgment creditor cannot garnish A to
reach the debt owed by A to B on the ground that, since both A and B are liable
for the entire amount of the judgment, garnishment of A is not permitted. Such
proceedings could add nothing to the liability of A as regards the judgment.
Earlier cases involving garnishment of a co-defendant under a judgment in
solido reached the same result by holding that the garnishment process was not
available since the co-defendant could not be classed as a "third person" under
the terms of LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 246(1) (3) (1870). J. T. Bailey & Co.
v. Lacey, Terry & Co., 27 La. Ann. 39 (1875). In the case of A. M. & J. C.
Dupont, Inc. v. Boudreaux, 182 So. 184 (La. App. 1938) the court specifically
rejected this analysis.
The fruits of an immovable produced while it is under seizure are considered
as being part of the property seized and inure to the benefit of the party making
the seizure. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 466 (1870); LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 656
(1870). Thus when plaintiff seizes defendant's rental property it is unnecessary
to garnish the lessee for the periodic rent payments since plaintiff is entitled to receive the rent by operation of law. In Summers & Brannins v. Clark, 30 La. Ann.
436 (1878), the plaintiff not only seized defendant's rental property under a fieri
facias but also garnished the tenant. The court commented that under the circumstances "the process of garnishment was unnecessary, and constituted simply
another seizure of what was already under seizure." Id. at 439.
12. Blitz v. Guenin, 187 So. 690 (La. App. 1.939) ; Bank of Monroe v. Ouachita
Valley Bank, 124 La. 798, 50 So. 718 (1909); Levy, Loeb, Scheuer & Co. v.
Acklen, 37 La. Ann. 545 (1885) ; McDonald v. Mechanics' & Traders' Ins. Co., 32
La. Ann. 594 (1880) ; Lannes v. Courege, 31 La. Ann,. 74 (1879) ; Safford v. Maxwell, 23 La. Ann. 345 (1871) ; A. & J. Trounstein v. Rosenham, 22 La. Ann. 525
(1870) ; A. F. Flournoy & Co. v. Milling, 15 La. Ann. 473 (1860) ;
0. Nelson
& Co. v. Simpson, 9 La. Ann. 311 (1854); Rightor v. Slidell, 9 La. Ann. 602
(1854) ; but of. Carl v. Young, 9 La. Ann. 272 (1854).
It is to be noted in this regard that under Articles 466 and 656 of the Revised
Civil Code (1870), when seizure is made of an immovable such as houses or land,
the fruits produced while it is under seizure inure to the benefit of the, person
making the seizure by operation of law. Thus, when plaintiff seizes defendant's
rental property under a writ of fieri facias, any rent owing to the defendant will
be seized by the sheriff and delivered to plaintiff without the necessity of garnishment proceedings against the lessee. Summers & Brannins v. Clark, 30 La. Ann.
436 (1878).
13. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 481-487 (1952). Professor Millar points out that older writers believed that
in London this practice represented a survival of the law in force at the time of
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citizen of London, by use of the foreign attachment, could pursue
the effects and credits of a nonresident debtor in the hands of a
third person. The desire to expand the jurisdiction of this institution brought about such a disfigurement of practice that by
the latter part of the nineteenth century, attachment of property
on mesne process disappeared completely in England. 4 However,
the principles of foreign attachment were particularly desirable
for the early colonies since a local debtor could easily move to
another English-speaking jurisdiction to escape from his creditors. 15 Foreign attachment became so entrenched in American
procedural systems that it became a general pattern of business. 16
The name "garnishment" was derived by the English from
the French word "garnissement," which means "a warning to a
person not to pay money or deliver property to another, but appear and answer to plaintiff's suit."'1 7 It was from the English
jurisprudence that the redactors of the Code of Practice of 1825
introduced garnishment process into the law of Louisiana. 8
However, garnishment process in Louisiana bears only a general
resemblance to the procedure then in use in England 9 and other
common law jurisdictions. 20 Strangely, although the word "garnishment" is of French origin, "garnissement" is not used in
France to designate the remedy corresponding to that of Louisiana.2 1 It is settled that if recourse is taken to the origin of garnishment process, reference should be made to the jurisprudence
22
of common law jurisdictions and not the laws of France.
Writs Under Which GarnishmentProcess May Issue
Under the Code of Practice of 1870, the use of garnishment
proceedings is authorized only in connection with the writs of
attachment and fieri facias, and cannot be used as an accessory
the Roman occupation of Britain. He states that this "may be dismissed as something out of the realm of legend." Id. at 482.
14. Id. at 483.
15. Id. at 485.
16. Id. at 486.
17. CRoss, PLEADIoS it COURTS OF ORDINARY JURISDICTION 335 (1885).
18. Monroe Grocery Co. v. J. A. Perdue & Co., 123 La. 375, 48 So. 1002
(1909) ; CRoss, PLEADINOS IN COURTS OF ORDINARY JURISDICTION 335 (1885).
19. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 810 Ct seq. (3d ed. 1940) ; 14
HA4snuR, LAWS OF ENGLAND 106 et seq. (2d ed. 1934). It is to be noted that
garnishment under a writ of fieri facias still obtains in England. Ibid.
20. See generally 4 Am. JuR. 533 et seq. (1936).
21. The French counterpart to the Louisiana garnishment process is called
8aiaie-arrdt. See CUCHE, PRICIS DES VOCES D'EXICUTION § 91 et seq. (1952).
22. Monroe Grocery Co. v. J. A. Perdue & Co., 123 La. 375, 48 So. 1002 (1909).
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to the writ of sequestration. 23 The Louisiana Law Institute has
recognized that no valid reason exists to deprive a plaintiff of
the advantages of garnishment process in this instance, 24 and has
provided for garnishment under the writ of sequestration 25 in
the proposed new Code of Practice. Since garnishment process
is presently available only as an accessory to the writ of attachment or fieri facias, the availability of this proceeding in turn
depends upon whether plaintiff is entitled to procure the issuance
of one of these writs.26 If no writ is procured, on which to base
the garnishment proceeding,2 7 or if an improper writ is obtained,2 8 garnishment cannot take place and any action taken is
null. Garnishment of defendant's property will be effected, however, if the sheriff has a proper and subsisting writ in his hands
at the time he cites 29 the third person to answer the interrogatories.30 Garnishment cannot be made, however, if before citation of the third person the writ has expired,3 ' or has been returned by the sheriff.32 By the same token, even if a valid garnishment is made, the proceedings will be null if the writ is later

dissolved. 33

23. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 246 (1870) and dicta in Ozan Lumber Co.
v. Goldonna Lumber Co., 124 La. 1025, 50 So. 839 (1909).
24. LouiSIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, ExPosig

DES MOTIFS No. 5, Book vii, tit. 1, p. 8 (1954).
25. Id. at 7, art. 4.
26. The grounds for obtaining a writ of attachment are not within the scope
of this Comment. Of. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 240 (1870).
27. 0. K. Realty Co. v. John A. Juliana, Inc., 1 La. App. 19 (1924) ; A. Roos
& Co. v. Merchants' Mutual Insurance Co., 28 La. Ann. 319 (1876) ; Matta V.
Thomas, 21 La. Ann. 37 (1869) ; Pollock v. Williams, 9 La. Ann. 460 (1854)
Erwin v. Commercial and Railroad Bank of Vicksburg, 3 La. Ann. 186 (1848)
Raboteau v. Valeton, 11 Rob. 218 (La. 1845).
28. Frellson, Stevenson & Co. v. Stewart, 14 La. Ann. 832 (1859).
29. As will more fully appear hereafter, in citing a third person as garnishee,
the sheriff serves the third person with plaintiff's petition in the suit of a defendant, the petition for issuance of garnishment proceedings, the interrogatories,
the citation, and notice of seizure.
30. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Myrtle Grove Syrup Co., 175 La. 969, 144
So. 730 (1932) ; Egana v. Bringier, 24 La. Ann. 164 (1872) ; Matta v. Thomas,
21 La. Ann. 37 (1869). Dicta in some cases indicate that it is sufficient that a
proper writ has been applied for at the time the sheriff serves the petition and
interrogatories on the garnishee. Pollock v. Williams, 9 La. Ann. 460 (1854);
Raboteau v. Valeton, 11 Rob. 218 (La. 1845). The validity of the garnishment
is unaffected if having had the writ in his hands at the time of the service of the
petition and interrogatories, the sheriff later returns the writ without retaining a
copy thereof. Egana v. Bringier, 24 La. Ann. 164 (1872). See also Dockham v.
New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 302 (1874).
31. Frellson, Stevenson & Co. v. Anderson, 14 La. Ann. 65 (1859) ; Copley v.
Fretwell, 2 La. Ann. 310 (1847).
32. Simpson v. Allain, 7 Rob. 500 (La. 1844).
33. Lehman, Stein & Co. v. E. Martin & Co., 132 La. 231, 61 So. 212 (1913);
Rothschild v. Dennis & Davey, Gunby's Dec. 75 (1885). See also Collins v. Jones,
152 So. 802 (La. App. 1934).
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Whether the proceedings are based upon a writ of attachment
or upon a writ of fieri facias, virtually the same procedure is employed to effect a garnishment of defendant's property.8 4 The
few procedural differences which do arise in this regard, however, are important and well defined. These differences arise as
to the venue of garnishment proceedings," the time at which
judgment will be rendered ordering the garnishee to deliver defendant's property to the sheriff ;36 the parties who are entitled
to post bond to obtain the release of property seized ;37 the maximum time within which answers to the interrogatories may be
filed ;88 and, whether the seizure will be an amount to satisfy
plaintiff's claim alone, or plaintiff's unpaid judgment with
costs.8 9
The type of writ on which the garnishment process is based,
however, is not the only variable factor in garnishment procedure. Independent of whether the garnishment process is
based on a writ of attachment or fieri facias, procedural differences also arise depending on whether the type of property
sought to be garnished is earnings owed defendant by his employer, or other types of property belonging to defendant held
by a third person. These latter differences will be treated in a
40
subsequent section.
Venue
The relationships existing among plaintiff, defendant, and
garnishee differ, depending upon the character of the writ on
which the garnishment proceeding is based. During the course
of the suit against defendant, if plaintiff resorts to garnishment
under a writ of attachment the garnishment proceeding is merely an incident to the prosecution of the main demand against
34. The basic provisions for garnishment under the Code of Practice of 1870
are contained in the section on attachments. Under Article 246 it is provided that
garnishment under fieri faciaa is to be conducted "in the same manner and with
the same regulations as are provided in relation to garnishees in cases of attachment." Under the provisions of the proposed code the situation is reversed and
the basic provisions are treated in the section on execution of judgments. Under
Article 3 of Expos6 des motifs No. 18, bk. vii, Special Provisions, tit. I, Provisional Remedies, it is provided that "Except as otherwise provided, the provisions
applicable to garnishment under fieri facias apply also to garnishment under attachment or sequestration."
35. See page 452 infra.
36. See page 502 infra.
37. See page 479 infra.
38. See page 487 infra.
39. See page 472 infra.
40. See pages 464 and 506 infra.
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defendant. Under these circumstances the principal controversy

before the court is between plaintiff and defendant and, regardless of the parish in which a third person may be domiciled, the
court which has cognizance over the main demand is the court
of proper venue 41 in which to2 file a petition for the citation of
4
the third person as garnishee.

Different circumstances exist, however, where plaintiff has
already obtained a money judgment against defendant and re-

sorts to garnishment proceedings under a writ of fieri facias.
Here the controversy between plaintiff and defendant has ended
and the only issues before the court are between plaintiff and

garnishee. 43 Under these circumstances the status of the garnishee resembles that of a defendant, and the garnishee is thus
entitled to be proceeded against according to the rules of venue
for suits against defendants.4 4 As a general rule, therefore, a
petition for the issuance of garnishment process under a writ of
fieri facias is filed in the court of garnishee's domicile.4 5 If two
or more persons living in different parishes are sought to be
made garnishees, plaintiff will normally be required to institute
separate garnishment proceedings in each of such parishes.

When a money judgment is sought against a nonresident over
41. Justice of the peace courts may issue garnishment proceedings. Goodwin
v. Southern Kraft Co., 6 So.2d 783 (La. App. 1942). See also LA. CONST. art.
VII, § 48.
42. Marqueze & Co. v. LeBlanc, 29 La. Ann. 194 (1877). The decision in this
case settled the previously conflicting authorities on the venue of garnishment
under writs of attachment and of fieri facias. No venue provision is found in the
Code of Practice of 1870. The rules of venue in the Marqueze case are codified in
the proposed Code of Practice. See Louisiana State Law Institute, PROPOSED CODE
OF PRACTICE, Exposd des Motifs No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgments, art.
44, p. 31 (1953). Under this provision the venue for the writ of sequestration is
the same as that of the writ of attachment.
For a discussion of the relationship which garnishee bears to the merits of
the case as between plaintiff and defendant, and to plaintiff and defendant individually, see page 479 infra.
43. The suit against defendant and the garnishment proceeding under fieri
facias are considered separate and distinct and denial of mandamus sought to enforce payment of a judgment directly against defendant cannot be urged as res
judicata to a garnishment proceeding brought to execute the judgment. Bullis v.
Town of Jackson, 203 La. 289, 14 So.2d 1 (1943).
44. Marqueze & Co. v. LeBlanc, 29 La. Ann. 194 (1877). This rule of venue is
codified under the proposed Code of Practice. See generally note 42 supra. See
also Alter v. Pickett, 24 La. Ann. 513 (1872) ; Featherstone'h v. Compton, 3 La.
Ann. 380 (1848) ; Manuel Motor Co. v. Graham, 69 So.2d 64 (La. App. 1953). In
garnishment under fieri facias, defendant is not a party to the garnishment proceedings and is not served with notice of the proceedings. See note 117 infra.
45. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 89 (1870). This rule often places a hardship in cases where defendant is employed by a large corporation such as a railroad whose domicile is many miles away from defendant's residence. In many of
such cases the practical effect of this rule is to deprive plaintiff of the use of garnishment process. See Manuel Motor Co. v. Graham, 69 So.2d 64 (La. App. 1953).
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whom jurisdiction cannot be obtained by personal citation, plaintiff may be forced to obtain jurisdiction based on the attachment
of whatever property of the nonresident that may be found within the state.46 In this regard, the use of garnishment proceedings
under a writ of attachment to search out and seize property held
by third persons (which belongs to the nonresident) is an important means of establishing jurisdiction. The parish in which it
is known or suspected that one or more third persons can be
found in possession of the nonresident's property or credits will
determine an available venue for the institution of the suit
against the nonresident, as well as the institution of garnishment
proceedings against the third persons. 47 Since jurisdiction is dependent upon the attachment of the nonresident's property, if it
develops that none of the third persons cited as garnishees hold
property or credits belonging to the nonresident, the result is
that nothing is attached and plaintiff's suit against defendant
will be dismissed. 48 If any of defendant's property or credits is
attached in the hands of a garnishee,49 or if a garnishee fails to
answer the interrogatories propounded him and is cast in judgment for the sum of money claimed by plaintiff,50 the jurisdiction
of the court is established and the principal demand may be tried
on the merits.51 Once jurisdiction has been established, plaintiff
is not forced to rely solely on the property thus attached for the
satisfaction of the judgment he hopes to obtain against defendant. The jurisdiction thus conferred on the court includes juris46. See LA. CoDE

OF PRACTICE art. 240(2) (1870) ; LA. R.S. 13:3952 (1950).
47. As will be more fully treated on page 454 infra, in this instance the court
in which these proceedings are brought could cite several third persons within the
parish as garnishees, and jurisdiction will be established if property belonging to
the nonresident is attached in the hands of any one of such garnishees.
48. Germania Savings Bank v. Peuser, 40 La. Ann. 796, 5 So. 75 (1888)
Rose & McCarthy v. Whalet & Edwards, 14 La. Ann. 374 (1859) ; Oliver v. Gwin,
17 La. 28 (1841). It would appear that the dismissal of plaintiff's suit under these
circumstances would not preclude plaintiff from later efforts in the same court to
secure jurisdiction on the basis of nonresident attachment by the use of garnishment proceedings. In such proceedings the plaintiff may wish to cite other third
persons as garnishees, or indeed, may cause the citation of the same third persons
previously made garnishees in the hopes that in the interim property belonging to
defendant may have come into their hands.
It is to be noted that even though the garnishee has no property belonging to
the nonresident, if garnishee fails to answer and a judgment pro confesso is awarded against him, this will be sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of the court,
though in a technical sense no property belonging to the nonresident has been attached. Spring v. Barr, 120 So. 256 (La. App. 1929).
49. LA. R.S. 13:3952 (1950).
50. Spring v. Barr, 120 So. 256 (La. App. 1929). See note 48 supra.
51. The merits of the main demand against defendant could not be tried until
the jurisdiction of the court is established. Any attempt at trial of the merits
for the time would be subject to the exception of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant.
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diction over the entire demand asserted by plaintiff, and as a
necessary incident to this jurisdiction, the court has power to
extend its process to property belonging to defendant located
anywhere within the state.52 Thus in suits based on nonresident
attachment, as in the case of suits based on personal citation of
defendant, the court which has cognizance of the main demand is
the court of proper venue to petition for the initiation of garnishment proceedings under a writ of attachment.
Persons Who May Be Made Garnishees
Garnishment proceedings may be both annoying and costly to
a party who is made garnishee. While it would appear that adequate safeguards should be available to protect against abuse of
the right to use garnishment process, plaintiff is allowed much
freedom in the selection of parties he may cause to be cited as
garnishees. Under the provisions of both the Code of Practice of
1870, 53 and the Proposed Code, 54 any "third person" is subject to
being made garnishee at plaintiff's request. While all parties
other than plaintiff and defendant are normally regarded as being strangers or "third persons" as to the principal litigants,
there are nevertheless some parties who cannot be made garnishees.
Under some circumstances, the nature of the legal relations
existing between a third party and defendant are such that citation of the party as garnishee would be equivalent to the garnishment of defendant himself. Parties thus identified with the defendant 55 are not "third persons" within the meaning of the
Code, and therefore cannot be made garnishees. Thus, when defendant is an interdict, his property cannot be garnished in the
hands of his curator since the latter stands in the place of the
interdict in all matters pertaining to the possession and administration of the interdict's estate. 56 A person may or may not be
regarded as a third party subject to citation as garnishee depending upon the capacity in which the party possesses defendant's property. Thus in cases where defendant is a corporation,
corporate officers who possess corporate property in their ca52. Kahn & Bigart v. Sippili, 35 La. Ann. 1039 (1883).
53. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 246(1) (3) (1870).
54. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE,

PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOSt

DES MoThs No. 15, Book IV, Execution ofJudgments, p. 26, art. 39 (1953).
55. Regarding the citation of a co-defendant as garnishee when judgment in
solido has been obtained against several defendants see note 11 supra.
56. Converse v. Dicks, 179 La. 339, 154 So. 17 (1934).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVIII

pacity as officers are not third persons subject to citation as
garnishees. 57 However, it would not be denied that the same officers could be made garnishees in their capacity as debtors of
the corporation for the unpaid subscriptions on the stock which
they held in the corporation.5"
The rule that any party who may be considered as a "third
person" within the contemplation of the Code is subject to being
made garnishee admits of at least one exception. While a wife in
her capacity as debtor to the community is technically a "third
person" in regard to the community, it has nevertheless been held
that the wife is not subject to garnishment by creditors of the
community. 59
Once it has been determined that various parties belong to the
class of persons subject to citation as garnishee, plaintiff may
freely choose which party or parties he wishes the court to make
garnishee. Plaintiff's choice is not restricted to making only
those parties garnishees who may reasonably be expected to hold
property belonging to defendant. 60 The courts have sanctioned
57. Swift & Co. v. Centerville Co., 161 La. 183, 108 So. 408 (1926). The court
in this case observed that in other states a contrary result is reached. The decisions are usually based on local statutes permitting such action. No statute in
Louisiana authorizes this action.
58. Brode v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 8 Rob. 244 (1844) semble.
59. Kelly & Frazier v. Robertson, 10 La. Ann. 303 (1855). The announced
basis of decision in this case was that the husband could not sue the wife to collect
the community debt, and that it was not intended that a creditor could exercise
any greater right than the debtor himself could exercise. This rationale is not
sound, however, as is pointed out by the court in the garnishment case of Summers & Brannins v. Clark, 30 La. Ann. 436, 466 (1878).
60. Article 246(3) of the Code of Practice would seem to require that a judgment creditor must have "reason to believe" that a third party holds property of
defendant or is indebted to him before the judgment creditor could use garnishment under fieri facias. Article 246(1) of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870
providing for garnishment under writ of attachment would seem to indicate that
a party could be made garnishee only if plaintiff "knows or suspects" that prospective garnishee has in his possession property belonging to the defendant, or
that he is indebted to the defendant. From a practical standpoint, the requirement of simple suspicion, without regard to the reasonableness of such suspicion,
is tantamount to permitting garnishment of whomever the plaintiff desires. No
cases were found where the court attempted to delve into the question of whether
plaintiff actually did have "knowledge or suspicion" or "reason to believe" that
the garnishee had any property or credits belonging to defendant. Some decisions
have permitted garnishment under circumstances which would tend to indicate
that these requirements are disregarded. See note 61 infra.
In the proposed Code of Practice the requirement of "knowledge or suspicion"
or "reason to believe" is omitted, the appropriate article reading simply ". . . by
petition the [plaintiff] may cause a third person to be cited as a garnishee. . ....
See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, ExPOst DES
MOTIFS, No. 15, Book IV, Emecution of Judgments, art. 39, p. 26 (1953). It is
to be noted that while the compilers of the proposed new Code have not prescribed
more stringent requirements as to who may be made garnishee, they have given
the garnishee some relief from the burden and risks imposed on a party made
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the garnishment of parties even though there is only a remote
possibility that any of defendant's property will be found. 61
Furthermore, plaintiff is not limited in the number of parties

he may cause to be cited. In one case the court permitted the
garnishment of forty-nine insurance companies based on.plaintiff's belief that certain property destroyed by fire might have

been owned by defendant and that if so, the defendant might
62
have carried fire insurance.

Property Which Is Subject to Garnishment
Although a third party may hold property or credits belonging to defendant, and although such party belongs to the class of
persons subject to citation as garnishee, plaintiff may nevertheless be prevented from garnishing all or part of defendant's
property because the property itself is of a type which is exempt
from seizure by statute. Ordinarily plantiff may garnish all
species of defendant's0 3 property which is under the garnishee's
control,0 4 whether that property consists of the tangible effects
belonging to defendant, or whether it takes the form of an in0 5
corporeal right such as a debt owed defendant by the garnishee.
By special statutes, however, garnishment process cannot be
used to seize certain items. 66
garnishee. As will 'be later noted, the compilers of the code have provided new
safeguards for garnishee against the risk of being liable for the whole of plaintiff's claim under a judgment pro confesso, for parties to answer the garnishment
interrogatories. See page 497 infra.
61. Isaac v. Commission Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 204 La. 1, 14
So.2d 865 (1943) (fishing expedition by plaintiff).
62. Ibid. This was done under a single writ of fieri faecia8.
63. For the legal effect of garnishee's claim of ownership of the property garnished, and the procedure to establish that such property in fact belongs to defendant, see page 480 infra.
64. It would appear that factual control by a third person over the defendant's
property is sufficient possession to authorize the use of garnishment process,
whether or not the garnishee's control is based on legal authority. Buddig v.
Simpson, 33 La. Ann. 375 (1881).
Article 262 of the Code of Practice of 1870 speaks in terms of the garnishment
of property belonging to defendant which the garnishee has in his possession, by
whatever title he may possess the same, as well as what sums he may owe to such
defendant, whether the same be due or not yet due. In Ivens v. E. M. Ivens & Co.,
30 La. Ann. 249, 250 (1878), it was said that "title" in this article referred to the
right by which the garnishee holds for or under the defendant as bailee, lessee,
or otherwise. It would appear from this case that defendant's luggage in a hotel,
or defendant's valuables in a bank safety deposit box could be effectively seized
under garnishment process. Article 262 does not apply to the case where the garnishee himself claims ownership of the property. Ivens v. B. M. Ivens d Co., supra.
When garnishee answers claiming title to the property, garnishment process cannot reach the property though it in fact belongs to defendant. Garnishment process
cannot be used as a substitution for the revocatory action or the action in declaration of simulation.
65. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 642, 241 (1870).
66. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 644 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1942, No.
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188, § 1, pp. 711-12 (some of the exempt items are the books, tools and instruments
necessary for the execution of defendant's trade or calling; certain basic household furniture, appliances, and utensils including "bed, bedding or bedstead ....
cooking stove, and utensils of said stove, . . . plates, dishes, knives and forks ....
spoons, . . . dining table and dining chairs, . . . washtub, . . . smoothing iron, ironing furnaces ... ;" linen and wearing apparel; and the rights of personal servitude
against the estate of a minor child).
LA. R.S. 22:647 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 139, § 1, p. 328 (the
proceeds of annuity endowment, and life insurance policies).
LA. R.S. 23:1205 (1950) (the payments due for workmen's compensation).
LA. R.S. 23:1693 (1950) (unemployment compensation).
LA. R.S. 46:111 (1950) (pensions).
LA. R.S. 17:1013 (1950) (retirement system benefits, Orleans Parish School
employees).
LA. R.S. 17:883 (1950) (Orleans Parish Teacher's Retirement System Benefits; State School Employees' Retirement System Benefits).
LA. R.S. 17:573 (1950) (Teacher's Retirement System Benefits).
LA. R.S. 17:1233 (1950) (School Lunch Employees' Retirement System Benefits).
LA. R.S. 33:6103 (1950) (Parochial Employees' Retirement System Benefits).
LA. R.S. 33:7154 (1950) (Municipal Employee Retirement System Fund).
Certain other types of defendant's property which are exempt include gratuitous
payments made by employers to their employees or his survivors. LA. R.S. 20:33
(1950) : family portraits; musical instruments played or practiced by any member
of defendant's family; arms and military accoutrements; or poultry or fowls for
family use. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 644 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1942,
No. 188, § 1, pp. 711-12. Money allowed for succession of deceased husband to
dependent widow as widow in necessitous circumstances. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3252
(1870). See Johnson v. Bolt, 146 So. 375 (La. App. 1933).
Under the homestead exemption provision in LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1, the following are exempt from seizure even though they are not found on the homestead:
two work horses, one wagon or cart, one automobile truck, one yoke of oxen, two
cows and calves, twenty-five head of hogs, or 1,000 pounds of bacon, or its equivalent in pork. Of course, land or property lying outside the state is not subject to
seizure by garnishment process issuing from Louisiana courts. Bancker v. W. Harrington & Co., 30 La. Ann. 136 (1878). Property taken from a prisoner by the
sheriff cannot be garnished since in legal contemplation such money is considered
as still being upon his person except for the purpose for which it was impounded.
Property or money carried on the person is not subject to attachment or sequestration. See Hotel Grunewald Co. v. Brakenridge, 13 Orl. App. 174 (La. App.
1916). See also Whitney Central Trust & Savings Bank v. Norton, 157 La. 199,
102 So. 306 (1924).
The jurisprudence has extended the types of property exempt from seizure to
include funds belonging to the Federal Government irrespective of the nature of
defendant's claim to the funds. Works & Rhea v. Shaw, 156 So. 81 (La. App.
1934) ; Quigles v. Davis, Gunby's Dec. 89 (La. 1885). Similarly, with the exception of liability for wages, salaries, and commissions of employees, funds belonging
to the state government, or any of its political subdivisions are not ordinarily
subject to seizure by garnishment process. Works & Rhea v. Shaw, 156 So. 81
(La. App. 1934) ; Droz v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 36 La. Ann. 340 (1884).
But property owned by a municipality which is not and can never be needed for
strictly municipal or public purposes may be treated as the private assets of the
municipality and may be levied on and sold under execution for the debts of the
'corporation. Bullis v. Town of Jackson, 203 La. 289, 14 So.2d 1 (1943).
The clerk of court may be made garnishee if he holds property belonging to
defendant in his custody. Whitney Central Trust & Savings Bank v. Norton, 157
La. 199, 102 So. 306 (1924) ; A. Lehman & Co. v. Rivers, 110 La. 1079, 35 So.
296 (1903) ; Nugent v. McCaffrey, 33 La. Ann. 271 (1881) ; Estate of Mille &
Braud v. Hebert. 19 La. Ann. 58 (1867) ; Ealer v. McAllister & Co., 14 La. Ann.
821 (1859).
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The earnings owed defendant by his employer are normally
only partially exempt from garnishment.8

T

Defendant's earnings

are wholly exempt, however, in cases where they are derived
from employment with the federal government, 68 and in certain
cases in which the main demand against defendant is based on a
cause of action arising outside the state.6 9 In all other instances, 7 0 80% of defendant's wages are exempt from garnishment, subject to the further qualification that in no event can
defendant be deprived of a minimum of $60 of his earnings each
month, this sum being always exempt. 71 It is to be noted that

this exemption for defendant's earnings can be effectively circumvented if plaintiff procures an assignment of wages from
defendant. 72 This result would appear to be against the spirit

of the earnings' exemption, since plaintiff may obtain all of defendant's earnings under an assignment. However, the theory is

that the assignment operates automatically to vest the earnings
67. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 644, as amended, La. Acts 1942, No. 188,
pp. 711-12; LA. R.S. 13:3912 (1950).
68. See note 66 supra.
69. Under LA. R.S. 13:3912 (1950), in cases where the cause of action arose
outside this state, defendant's wages are exempt from garnishment if the wages
are both earned outside of the state and are payable outside the state. It is provided that it is the duty of the garnishee in such cases to plead this exemption
unless the defendant is actually served with process. It is to be noted that this
exemption would not apply if the wages were either earned in Louisiana, or are
payable in Louisiana.
70. This exemption applies to all employments, whether the employee is skilled
or unskilled, whether the employee works for private enterprise or for the state
government or its political subdivisions, and whether compensation is paid in the
form of wages, salaries, or commissions. LA. CODE OF 'PRACTICE art. 644(2)
(1870).
The amendment to Article 644(2) in 1942 overturned the prior jurisprudence
to the effect that the salaries of state officials were exempt from seizure, e.g., see
Wild v. Ferguson, 23 La. Ann. 752 (1871). Similarly, the broad terms of the
amendment obviated the fine distinction which grew up over the interpretation of
the word "laborer." See, e.g., Groves & Rosenblath v. Atkins, 160 La. 489, 107 So.
316 (1926).
71. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 644(2) (1870). In Civic Agency v. Quealy,
172 So. 555, 556 (La. App. 1937), the proper method of computing this exemption was said to be: "... if [the employee] earned as much as $60 [he] should
receive not less than $60, but that, if he received more than $60, 20 per cent of
the total should be subject to seizure, provided that the deduction from the total
of 20 per cent should not reduce the balance available to the employee to less than
$60." (Emphasis added.) See also Jones v. Commagere, 189 So. 603 (La. App.
1939) (court made inquiry to determine amount of total salary).
72. Squairs v. Hall, Gunby's Dec. 24 (La. 1885) ; Thomas v. Young, 71 So.2d
368 (La. App. 1954).
However, if the assignment of wages is for a loan under the "Small Loan Act"
the employer must consent in writing to the assignment, and the lender can obtain
an assignment of only ten percent of the employee's salary. LA. R.S. 6:587, 588, as
amended (1952). Whether this limitation on the percentage of assignable salary
prohibits an assignment of ten percent of the salary to a second lender after the
employee has already assigned ten percent of his wages to a prior lender is not
clear.
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in plaintiff as they accrue, and thus no wages are ever owed de73
fendant to which the earnings' exemption could apply.
Even though the property or credits are of a type subject to
seizure under garnishment process, plaintiff may nevertheless be
prevented from seizing them because defendant's right to the
ownership of the property or credits in question is so imperfect
that it cannot be said to belong to defendant. Whether defend-

ant's right to ownership of the property or credits is sufficient
to support a seizure under garnishment process is determined
solely from the facts existing at the time the interrogatories and
other pleadings are served on the garnishee7 4 since this is the
time at which seizure is effected.7 5 The general rule under the
provision of the Code of Practice is that defendant's right to the
property and credits held by a third person is sufficient to sup-

port seizure under garnishment process if the defendant is in all
respects entitled to ownership of the property or credits or if the
only imperfection in his ownership is that the time for payment
or delivery has not yet arrived.7 6 Thus a sum owed defendant at
73. Thomas v. Young, 71 So.2d 368 (La. App. 1954). The Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution may operate to circumvent the
exemptions from garnishment process when a foreign judgment is rendered against
the garnishee, even though the defendant is a Louisiana resident, and his labor is
performed in this state and he is always paid in Louisiana. See Williams v. St.
Louis & S.W. Ry. Co., 109 La. 90, 33 So. 94 (1902).
74. Silverman v. Grinnell, 165 La. 587, 115 So. 789 (1928); Humphrey v.
Midkiff, 122 La. 939, 48 So. 331 (1909) ; Maduel v. Mousseaux, 29 La. Ann. 228
(1877) ; Blanchard v. Cole, 8 La. 160 (1835) (semble); Simon v. Hulse, 124
So. 845 (La. App. 1929). The general rule is that seizure affects only such property and credits subject to garnishment which are in the garnishee's custody at
the moment seizure is effected, and from the fact that seizure takes effect upon the
service of the interrogatories and the other pleadings on the garnishee. See textual
discussion at page 471 infra. An express exception to this rule is made in Article
4667 of the Civil Code of 1870, which provides that the fruits of an immovable
property gathered or produced under seizure are considered as coming under the
seizure. A second exception to this rule is found in LA. R.S. 13:3921-3927 (1950),
where wages or salaries are garnished. See page 506 infra.
75. See page 471 infra.
76. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 246 (1870).

Under Article 246(3), the seizure

of the property and credits takes place as of the moment of the service of the
interrogatories. In any event, though seizure is effected, the garnishee is not ordered to deliver the property to the sheriff until the time for payment or delivery
has arrived. In cases of garnishment under writ of attachment, the court will not
render this order until after judgment has been obtained against the defendant.
See page 502 infra. See also Silverman v. Grinnell, 165 La. 587, 115 So. 789
(1928) ; Maduel v. Mousseaux, 29 La. Ann. 228 (1877).
It is to be noted that garnishment process may be used to seize sums due defendant under an executory or completed contract, even though the garnishee
claims that for some reason, such as breach of contract, nothing is due defendant.
In such cases plaintiff could traverse the answers of the garnishee and on trial
of the traverse, a very summary proceeding, attempt to force the settlement of
the dispute arising out of the contract between garnishee and defendant. The
garnishee could be seriously prejudiced by trying the dispute in the garnishment
proceeding, rather than trying it under ordinary process in a suit between himself
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a future date on a non-negotiable promissory note may be garnished before maturity of the note. 77 Under this general rule,
no basis for garnishment exists, however, if the defendant's
claim to ownership of the property or credit in question is contingent in nature. 7 Accordingly, the residual interest which an
heir has in a succession under administration cannot be garnished. 79 Similarly, damages which defendant claims for personal injury from a tortfeasor cannot be garnished before the
defendant has been awarded a judgment by the court.8 0 The
mere fact that a dispute exists between defendant and garnishee
as to the precise amount of money owed defendant does not of
itself classify the garnishee's liability as contingent.8 ' At least
two exceptions 2 have been made to the general rule that in order
to form a basis for seizure under garnishment process defendant
must either be in all respects entitled to ownership of the property or credits in question, or else the only imperfection in his
ownership is that the time for payment or delivery has not yet
arrived.
and defendant. Accordingly the jurisprudence permits the garnishee to object to
the trial of such issues in the garnishment proceeding. If garnishee fails to object,
however, he loses his right to the determination of the issue by ordinary process.
These situations are discussed more fully on page 481 infra.
77. See Ober, Nanson & Co. v. Matthews, 24 La. Ann. 90 (1872) ; Blanchard
v. Cole, 8 La. 160 (1835) ; Brode v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 8 Rob. 244 (La. 1844) ;
Frazier v. Willcox, 4 Rob. 517 (1843); Helme v. C. W. Pollard & Co., 14 La.
Ann. 306 (1859) ; White v. Bird, 20 La. Ann. 188 (1868) ; Cargill v. Otwell, 3
La. App. 197 (1925).
78. Silverman v. Grinnell, 165 La. 587, 115 So. 789 (1928) ; Maduel v. Mousseaux, 29 La. Ann. 228 (1877); Coleman, Britton & Withers v. Finnimore, 16
La. Ann. 253 (1861) (installment owed defendant under a building contract cannot be garnished if failure to complete the contract on time operates to forfeit the
installment). Of course, if the installment is absolutely due at the time the interrogatories are served, the installment may be garnished. See Morehouse Lumber
& Bldg. Material Co. v. Jacob & Walker, 139 So. 713 (La. App. 1932), aff'd on
rehearing, 144 So. 190 (La. App. 1932), aff'd, 177 La. 76, 147 So. 504 (1933).
See Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1115 (1933).
79. First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Drexler, 171 So. 151 (La. App. 1936).
This decision is also based on the ground that to permit garnishment would hamper
the administration of the estate. As to the heir's interest in an unliquidated succession for which no administrator or executor has been appointed, see note 110
infra.
80. National Park Bank v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 159 La. 86, 105 So.
234 (1925); Peet, Yale & Bowling v. J. J. McDaniel & Co., 27 La. Ann. 455
(1875).
81. See Appalachian Corp. of La. v. Compania General de Petroleo, 162 La.
774, 111 So. 160 (1927) ; Marchand v. Bell, 21 La. Ann. 33 (1869).
82. A third exception arises on grounds and policy considerations independent
of the nature of the claims which defendant has against property belonging to him
in the garnishee's hands. Plaintiff may seize assets which defendant has pledged
to the garnishee, but such assets are sold subject to the garnishee-pledgee's claim.
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Oldham, 38 La. Ann. 553 (1886). This decision rests on the
policy of the law that the property of a debtor is the common pledge of all his
creditors, and that the pledgee's right is only that of priority of privilege over the
plaintiff on the proceeds from the sale of the property.
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The first exception is a product of the jurisprudence, and
operates to subject to seizure property and credits of defendant
which may be said to be in esse at the time the interrogatories
and other pleadings are served on the garnishee.8 8 Under this
rule the courts are apparently willing to permit the seizure of
property and credits at the time of the service of the interrogatories and other pleadings even though the defendant's right to
receive them in the future is dependent upon the occurrence of
one or more contingent events. Thus when defendant lumber
company and the garnishee are parties to an executory contract
to mill and sell lumber, plaintiff is permitted to seize the proceeds which may later accrue to defendant under the contract,
although defendant's right to such proceeds is contingent upon
the performance by defendant of his obligation to saw the logs
supplied him, and although the amount of such proceeds is dependent upon the number of logs supplied and the price at which
the lumber is sold.8 4 The courts have not defined the nature of
the minimum legal claim which defendant must have in property

or credits to categorize them as being in esse. Due to the small
number of cases on the question, no accurate guide can be formulated to determine in a given case whether defendant's claim to
property and credits will be considered as being contingent in

nature and thus not subject to seizure, or whether seizure will
be permitted on the ground that as to defendant the property
and credits are in esse.85 It is to be noted that in a limited sense
83. This rule was apparently first stated in the case of Humphrey v. Midkiff,
122 La. 939, 48 So. 331 (1909), as a means to explain the decisions in the cases
of Buddig v. Simpson, 33 La. Ann. 375 (1881) and J. E. Fay & Egan Co. v.
Ouachita Excelsior Saw and Planing Mills, 50 La. Ann. 205, 23 So. 312 (1898),
connecting case, 51 La. Ann. 1708, 26 So. 386 (1899). The most recent acknowledgments of this rule were made in the cases of Simon v. Hulse, 124 So. 845 (La.
App. 1929) and United States v. Feazel, 49 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. La. 1943).
84. J. E. Fay & Egan Co. v. Ouachita Excelsior Saw and Planing Mills, 50
La. Ann. 205, 23 So. 312 (1898), connecting case, 51 La. Ann. 1708, 26 So. 386
(1899). But cf. Coleman, Britton & Withers v. Fennimore, 16 La. Ann. 253
(1861) (installment owed defendant under a building contract cannot be garnished
if failure to complete the contract on time operates to forfeit the installment).
85. "In esse" is defined in BLACK'S LAw DrcTIoNARy (4th ed. 1951) as "in
being" or "actually existing." In the Pay d Egan case (referred to above) it
could be said that defendant had some contract right at the time the interrogatories and the pleadings were served upon him. But cf. Buddig v. Simpson, 33 La.
Ann. 375 (1881), in which seizure was permitted of money placed under garnishee's custody after the interrogatories were served, though on the same day. In
the case of Humphrey v. Midkiff, 122 La. 939, 48 So. 331 (1909), it was said
that the deposit was "in esse" on the day service was made and therefore subject
to seizure. This case would apparently suggest that the seizing power of the writ
on which the garnishment proceeding is based has an extended life. As to this
question, see page 471 infra. It would appear that these cases have nothing in
common from which any rule could be devised to predict the treatment the court
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the general rule under the provisions of the Code of Practice of
1870 permits seizure of property and credits which are in esse by
authorizing seizure, although the time of delivery or payment
of the property and credits in question has not yet arrived. It
was probably the intention of the compilers of the Code of Practice of 1870 that this should prescribe the limits within which
property and credits in esse should be subject to seizure under
garnishment process. When the passage of time is the sole obstacle to defendant's right to demand the property or credits
from the garnishee, there is no contingency and the court may
safely adjudicate upon the property and credits without prejudicing the rights of the garnishee, and without vainly attempting to seize that which may not accrue.
The second exception to the general rule regarding the nature
of the claim defendant must have to property and credits held
by the garnishee in order to support seizure under garnishment
process, arises from statutory enactment. By Act 181 of 193286
garnishment of wages, salaries, and commissions in the hands of
defendant's employer were exempted from the operation of the
general rule.8 7 Under this statute seizure is made under a single
garnishment proceeding not only of the accrued earnings due
defendant for the work he has performed, but also of so much
of defendant's future earnings as is necessary to satisfy plaintiff's claim. 8

It is to be noted in connection with the consideration of property which is subject to garnishment, that while normally the
rights which plaintiff has against the property or credits in
question are measured by the rights which defendant has against
the garnishee, under certain circumstances the plaintiff acquires
greater rights than those to which defendant is entitled. 89 The
will accord a given case. See also the case of Simon v. Hulse, 124 So. 845 (La.
App. 1929).
86. LA. R.S. 13:3921-3927 (1950). This statute is popularly known as the
"Continuing Garnishment Statute."
87. Prior to the enactment of this statute the general rule under Article 246
of the Code of Practice of 1870 permitted garnishment of only the accrued wages
owed defendant. See e.g., Humphrey v. Midkiff, 122 La. 939, 48 So. 331 (1909).
88. The detailed operation of the procedure for garnishment of defendant's
earnings will be treated subsequently, page 506 infra.
89. Exposition Ry. & Improvement Co. v. Canal St. Expositions Ry., 42 La.
Ann. 370, 7 So. 627 (1890) ; Summers & Brannins v. Clark, 30 La. Ann. 436, 439
(1878) : The statement is made in Summers case that "the proposition that the
of his debtor must be taken cum grano Balis, and is not absolutely true." See also
Relf & Co. v. Boro, 17 La. Ann. 258 (1865). Many cases overlook the technicalities involved and broadly state the contrary position. See, e.g., Kelly & Frazier v.
rights of a seizing creditor in garnishment process are precisely measured by thosp
Robertson, 10 La. Ann. 303 (1855).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVIII

defendant may divest himself of his rights to ownership of property or credits without divesting plaintiff of the right to treat
the property as still being owned by defendant. This situation
would arise in transactions involving the sale of a movable unaccompanied by delivery of the thing sold,9 0 or the assignment
of a debt without notice of the assignment to the debtor."'
Under such circumstances plaintiff could garnish both the sum
owed defendant and the thing sold even though the defendant
could exercise no rights of ownership against the vendee or
assignee.
GARNISHMENT OF PROPERTY AND CREDITS OTHER THAN
WAGES AND SALARIES

Procedure
The basic procedural rules governing garnishment proceedings are found in the Code of Practice. The demands imposed
upon the garnishee under the provisions of the Code of Practice
of 1870 produced undesirable results in cases where an employer was made garnishee in order to seize defendant's earnings.9 2 To remedy this situation, in 1932 the Legislature prescribed special rules which largely supplant the applicability of
the provisions of the Code of Practice to the garnishment of
wages, salaries, and commissions due defendant by his employer.93 These provisions are found in the Revised Statutes of
1950. 94 As a result of this special legislation, certain aspects of
the procedure prescribed to garnish defendant's earnings are
different from the procedure used to garnish other types of
property. The type of property sought to be garnished, therefore, is important in determining the procedure by which garnishment is effected. Since the differences in the two procedures
are not radical, the procedure for garnishing property other
than defendant's earnings will be presented first, and the procedure to garnish wages, salaries, and commissions will be separately treated by indicating the points at which these special
90. LA CIVIL CODE arts. 1922, 1923 (1870) ; Summers & Brannins v. Clark,
30 La. Ann. 436 (1878). See also Relf & Co. v. Boro, 17 La. Ann. 258 (1865).
91. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2642, 2643 (1870) ; Summers & Brannins v. Clark,
30 La. Ann. 436 (1878).
92. See page 506 infra.
93. La. Acts 1932, No. 18.
94. LA. R.S. 13:3921-3927 (1950). These provisions will not be incorporated
into the proposed Code of Practice, and will remain in the Revised Statutes. See
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOS]t DES
MOTIFS No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgment8 55 (1954).
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rules depart from the procedure prescribed under the provisions
of the Code of Practice.
Garnishment proceedings are often used to seize defendant's
bank account, or to seize a debt owed defendant by a third
person. Though seldom used for other purposes, garnishment
proceedings may likewise be utilized to seize tangible assets
belonging to defendant such as merchandise stored in another's
warehouse, or livestock and autos which may have been placed
in another's custody.
Petition. Garnishment proceedings must be commenced by
petition.9 5 When garnishment is sought under a writ of attachment, plaintiff ordinarily incorporates his request for garnishment process in the petition in which he institutes suit against
defendant. These proceedings may be requested by supplemental
petition, however, anytime before judgment is rendered in the
case. 90 The only allegations required as the grounds on which a
writ of attachment may be procured, are the amount of money
or property which plaintiff claims against defendant 97 and the
fact that plaintiff believes a designated third person is indebted
to defendant or holds property belonging to him. 8 It is not necessary for plaintiff to allege the circumstances under which
the garnishee is obligated to defendant.0 9 In the prayer of the
petition, plaintiff asks that a writ of attachment be issued; that
the designated third person be made and cited as garnishee;
and that he be ordered to answer the accompanying interroga95. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 250 (1870). LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE,
PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOSE DES MOTIFS, No. 15, Book IV - Execution of

Judgments art. 39 (1954) ; Koningh v. Knecht, 48 So.2d 409 (La. App. 1950).
Under LA. R.S. 13:3601 (1950), the petition must be verified. This requirement
is

deleted

in

LOUISIANA

STATE

LAW INSTITUTE,

PROPOSED CODE

OF PRACTICE,

ExPosIt DES MOTIFS No. 7-Title I, Pleading (1954).
96. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 250 (1870). Express authorization for garnishment process to issue by supplemental petitions has been omitted from the proposed
Code of Practice. General authorization for supplemental petitions are found in
LOUISIANA

STATE

LAW

INSTITUTE,

PROPOSED

CODE

OF PRACTICE,

EXPOS,

DES

MOTIFS No. 7, tit. 1, Pleading, c. 7, Amended and Supplemental Pleadings (1954).
97. Bird v. Cain, 6 La. Ann. 248 (1851). The description of the claim against
defendant is necessary in order to apprise garnishee of the amount of defendant's
assets seized in his hands, and of the amount of liability which the garnishee will
incur if he fails to answer the interrogatories. While the petition is the more appropriate plan, it may also be placed in the interrogatories. Failure to mention
specifically the definite amount claimed against defendant either in the petition or
the interrogatories is fatal to garnishment proceedings. National Park Bank v.
Concordia Land & Timber Co., 159 La. 86, 105 So. 234 (1925) ; Copley v. Snow,
4 La. Ann. 521 (1849). See also Bird v. Cain, 6 La. Ann. 248 (1851).
98. In

the case of garnishment of wages, salaries, and commissions, the fact

of employment must be alleged.
99. Rice Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Saunders, 130 La. 627,. 58 So. 413 (1912)
Bean v. Mississippi Union Bank, 5 Rob. 333 (La. 1843).
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tories.100 Plaintiff is not entitled of right to require the garni-

shee to answer the interrogatories in open court; this is a matter
which vests in the discretion of the court. 10 1 If plaintiff desires
that the garnishee answer in open court, he must specially pray
for this in his petition. 10 2 When garnishment is made under a
writ of fieri facias, the allegations and prayer of the petition
are substantially the same. 108 If personal jurisdiction can be
obtained over the third person by the court which rendered the
judgment, the garnishment proceedings may be commenced by

a supplemental petition to that court. 10 4 However, if the third
person sought to be garnished resides outside the jurisdiction
of the court, 10 5 these proceedings must normally be instituted
at the domicile of the third person. Here plaintiff must file an
original petition asking for the recognition and enforcement of
his judgment in addition to his request that garnishment proceedings be instituted against the third person. 0 6 In cases of
garnishment under either the writ of attachment or fieri facias,
so long as the rules of venue are observed plaintiff may in the
same petition cause two or more persons to be cited as garnishee. 10 7 This is a matter of convenience in pleading and though
100. See FLEMING, A FORMULARY OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 651 (1933) ; LOUISIANA

27 (1951).
101. State v. Rightor, 49 La. Ann. 696, 22 So. 245 (1897). The usual practice
is for the garnishee to answer the interrogatories under oath before a notary.
102. Whenever plaintiff thinks it proper to propound interrogatories to the
garnishee to be answered in open court, plaintiff is bound to move the court to
appoint a day for the garnishee to appear. If plaintiff fails to do so the garnishee
is relieved from the obligation of appearing in open court, and if the plaintiff proceeds to trial without procuring the appointment of a day, the plaintiff waives
his right to have the garnishee answer the interrogatories. Petway v. Goodin, 12
Rob. 445 (La. 1846). See also Cockfield v. Tourres, 24 La. Ann. 168 (1872);
Dwight v. Webster & Co., 7 La. Ann. 538 (1852) ; Spears v. Nugent, 2 La. Ann.
11 (1847) ; Parmely v. Bradbury, 13 La. 351 (1839).
103. The only difference is that plaintiff would allege the amount of the judgment he has obtained rather than the amount of money he originally claimed
against defendant. Of course, the prayer must be for the writ of fleri facia8 rather
than for a writ of attachment.
104. If garnishment process issues from the same court which rendered judgment in the principal demand the petition bears the same title and docket number
as the suit in which the judgment was rendered. In Bank of Monroe v. Ouachita
Valley Bank, 124 La. 798, 50 So. 718 (1909), the court held plaintiff's garnishment proceedings to be of no effect when plaintiff submitted a petition to the court
which rendered judgment in the principal demand bearing a different title and
docket number from the suit in which the judgment was rendered and the fieri
facias issued. There is some doubt as to whether this case would be followed today. Of. Kunnes v. Kogos, 168 La. 682, 123 So. 122 (1929).
105. See page 453 supra.
106. Normally plaintiff will ask for a writ of fieri facia8 in this petition. If
plaintiff wishes, however, he may procure his fieri facia8 from the court in which
he obtained his judgment against defendant and require the clerk thereof to send
the writ to the sheriff of the parish where the third person is domiciled. Featherstone'h v. Compton, 3 La. Ann. 380 (1848).
107. In Isaac v. Comision Reguladoro del Mercado de Henequen, 204 La. 1,
STATE BAR ASS'N, LA. FORMULARY ANNOTATED
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only one petition is filed, separate and distinct garnishment proceedings are brought against each garnishee cited. 08
Court order for garnishment process to issue - service by
the sheriff. Upon consideration of plaintiff's petition, most
courts issue a formal order for garnishment process to issue.
The issuance of such an order is not required by either the Code
of Practice of 1870, or the proposed Code of Practice. The Supreme Court has held that if the interrogatories are embodied
in the text of the petition an order for garnishment process to
issue is unnecessary. 0 9 The premise on which these cases are
based is that the copy of the petition containing the interrogatories and the citation as garnishee are sufficient notice to the
garnishee of the obligation under which he is to answer. Whether
an order is necessary if the interrogatories are simply attached
to the petition as in the case where the interrogatories are
printed on a standard form is undecided. It would appear, however, that if plaintiff recites in the text of the petition that he
wishes to have the attached interrogatories considered as being a
part of the petition itself, that sufficient warning would be given
to the garnishee and that no order for garnishment process to
issue would be necessary. 1 0 The safe course to follow in any
event is for the order to be issued.
The sheriff must cite the designated party as garnishee, and
must serve upon him a notice of seizure,"' and a copy of the
14 So.2d 865 (1943), forty-nine different garnishees in the same petition.
108. First National Bank v. Moss, 52 La. Ann. 170, 26 So. 828 (1899) ; Smith
v. McCall, 122 So. 149 (La. App. 1929).
109. Mitchell v. Murphy, 131 La. 977, 60 So. 636 (1913); Parmely v. Bradbury, 13 La. 351 (1839). It is to be noted that the Mitchell case speaks in terms
of an order for garnishment process to issue, and that the Parmely case speaks in
terms of an order for the garnishee to answer. Both refer to the question of
whether the garnishee is legally obligated to recognize the validity of the garnishment proceedings commenced against him. When an order for garnishee to answer
is issued by the court it would normally be in the form of an order for garnishment process to issue. The contents of an order for garnishment process to issue
ordinarily substantially tracks the prayer of the petition. But if the garnishee is
to be required to answer in open court an order is necessary. Dwight v. Webster
& Co., 7 La. Ann. 538 (1852).
110. The early case of Elder v. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 606 (1856) contains language which apparently holds the order unnecessary when the interrogatories are
simply attached to the petition. In light of the emphatic language used in the
Mitchell case, however, this case is of doubtful value.
111. The Code of Practice of 1870 contains no provision requiring that notice
of seizure be served upon the garnishee. But of. Ornelas v. Silvan Newburger Co.,
139 La. 832, 72 So. 372 (1916). In Billeaudeaux v. Manuel, 159 La. 146, 105 So.
256 (1925), garnishment was not permitted of an heir's interest in an unliquidated
succession because there was no legal representative appointed upon whom notice
of seizure could be served. For a case indicating that service of notice of seizure
is a requisite see Koningh v. Knecht, 48 So.2d 409 (La. App. 1950). Article 40
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petition and the interrogatories. 112 Under both the Code of Practice of 1870, and under the proposed Code, this service must be
personal. 113 This requirement of personal service has been rigidly
enforced and cannot be waived.1 4 If the garnishee has concealed
or absented himself in order to avoid personal service, the regular means of service of citation are authorized."15 Special rules
are provided for the garnishment of a partnership, and a domestic or foreign corporation. 1 6

There is no requirement that defendant be served with notice

7
that seizure has been made in the hands of the garnishee."1

Interrogatories.As previously indicated," 8 the interrogatories
may be listed separately and attached to the petition, or they
may be placed in the text of the petition itself. Since plaintiff
usually has little or no knowledge concerning the affairs of defendant, and since even with the use of interrogatories the answer which may be obtained from the garnishee cannot be con(Execution of Judgments) of the Proposed Code of Practice expressly provides for
the service of notice of seizure on garnishee.
1.12. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 252 (1870). See also Koningh v. Knecht, 48
So.2d 409 (La. App. 1950). In garnishment under attachment when garnishment
process is procured by supplemental petition, valid service on the garnishee can
be made only by service of both the original as well as the supplemental petition.
Lovell v. Cartwright, 17 La. 547 (1841.). In garnishment under fieri facias, it is
probable that service need be made only of the supplemental petition.
If notice of citation as garnishee is not served on the third party, the garnishment proceedings are null. J. A. Fay & Egan Co. v. Ouachita Excelsior S. & P.
Mill, 51 La. Ann. 1708, 26 So. 386 (1899). The sheriff is not obliged to follow any
particular sequence relative to the order in which he shall serve these pleadings.
LA. CODE OF PRACTIcE art. 256 (1870). Matthews v. Crescent City Mutual Insurance Co., 26 La. Ann. 386 (1874). Regarding the citation of a partnership as
garnishee see Dupierris v. lallisay, 27 La. Ann. 132 (1875) ; Bell v. R. 11. Short
& Co., 25 La. Ann. 312 (1873) ; Ferguson & O'Dowd v. Murphy & Co., 10 La.
Ann. 53 (1855) ; Felt & Tarrant Mfgr. v. Sinclair Agency, 4 La. App. 121 (1926).
113. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 246 (1.870) ; L.OUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRAcrIcE, Expost DES MOTIFS Book IV, Execution of
Judgments art. 40 (1954). Even a duly authorized agent cannot accept service.
Dickson & Co. v. Morgan, 6 La. Ann. 562 (1851). The return of the sheriff showing service on garnishee is presumed correct. Mercantile Adjustment Agency v.
Fabacher. 133 So. 1.75 (La. App. 1.931.).
114. John Phelps & Co. v. Broughton, 27 La. Ann. 592 (1875); Schindler v.
Smith. Bullins & Co., 18 La. Ann. 476 (1866).
115. LA. R.S. 13:3471(10) (1950); LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOSE DES MOTIFS No. 15, Book IV, Execution of
Judgments art. 40 (1954).
116. See note 115 supra.
117. In garnishment under fieri facias it has been held that it is not necessary
that defendant judgment debtor be served with notice of seizure. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Myrtle Grove Syrup Co., 175 La. 969, 144 So. 730 (1932). No case
or statute was found which requires notice of seizure to be served on defendant
when garnishment is made under a writ of attachment. Since notice to the debtor
is not necessary for nonresident attachment, it would follow by analogy that it
would not be necessary for garnishment under attachment.
118. See page 467 supra.

19581

COMMENTS

tradicted except by strong proof, 119 the courts early required the
garnishee to submit to the most pointed and searching interrogatories. 12 0 Plaintiff is entitled to probe the conscience of a garnishee and to make pertinent inquiries calculated to elicit the
truth as fully as he might do on cross-examination of defendant
himself.' 2 1 The scope and the nature of the interrogatories, however, must not go beyond the purpose of garnishment process
and can inquire only concerning any debts owed defendant by
the garnishee, or any property belonging to defendant which is
in the garnishee's custody. 22 If an interrogatory inquires about
other matters, however closely related they may be to the satisfaction of plaintiff's claim against defendant, the garnishee is
not required to answer." 3 The proper course for the garnishee
to follow in this event is to file an exception to the interrogatories indicating that due to the nature of the particular interrogatory no answer is required by law. 24 Thus an interrogatory
asking garnishee whether he was indebted to the wife of the
defendant is improper and need not be answered by the garnishee.125 Moreover, garnishment process cannot be used as a substitute for the revocatory action. Thus the garnishee is not required to answer an interrogatory inquiring whether property
held in the garnishee's own name really belongs to defendant. 2
When plaintiff prepares the interrogatories to accompany his
petition for garnishment proceedings he should take care to make
a full inquiry into whether the garnishee is indebted to defendant or holds property belonging to him. Aside from the obvious
advantage of an early determination of whether any of defendant's property or credits have been seized, it is to be noted that
once the initial set of interrogatories has been propounded to the
119. See page 501 infra.

120. E. H. Roquest & Co. v. Steamer B. E. Clark, 13 La. Ann. 210 (1858).
121. Denis v. Hogan, 2 McGloin 242 (La. 1884).
122. LA CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 246, 247, 642 (1870) ; E. H. Roquest & Co.
v. Steamer B. E. Clark, 13 La. Ann. 210 (1858). "The process of garnishment is
a method of seizure and not a bill of discovery." State National Bank v. C. J.
& J. S. Boatner, 39 La. Ann. 843, 845, 2 So. 589, 591 (1887).

123. First National Bank v. Moss, 52 La. Ann. 170, 26 So. 828 (1899) ; State
National Bank v. C. J. & J. S. Boatner, 39 La. Ann. 843, 2 So. 589 (1887);
Kearney v. Nixon, 19 La. Ann. 16 (1867) ; E. H-. Roquest & Co. v. Steamer B. E.
Clark, 13 La. Ann. 210 (1858).
124. First National Bank v. Moss, 52 La. Ann. 170, 26 So. 828 (1899) ; State
National Bank v. C. J. & J. S. Boatner, 39 La. Ann. 843, 2 So. 589 (1887);

Kearney v. Nixon, 19 La. Ann. 16 (1867).

Failure to file this exception might

result in a judgment pro confesso being rendered against garnishee in some cases.

125. First National Bank v. Moss, 52 La. Ann. 170, 26 So. 828 (1899).
126. Kearney v. Nixon, 19 La. Ann. 16 (1867). For numerous cases reciting
the prohibition against using garnishment process as a substitute for the revocatory
action, and the action in declaration of simulation, see note 175 infra.
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garnishee, plaintiff has no right to propound supplemental interrogatories, although under some circumstances the court in its
discretion may permit him to do so. As will be developed more
fully hereafter, answers of the garnishee which are responsive
to the interrogatories propounded are the sole measure of any
liability of the garnishee unless plaintiff can establish the garnishee's liability by successfully traversing the latter's answer in
accordance with stringent proof requirements. 127 It is much
easier for plaintiff to establish essential facts by eliciting them
from the garnishee through searching interrogatories than by
traversing his answers. So long as the garnishee's answer to the
initial interrogatories has not been filed there would appear to
be no objection to permitting plaintiff to file supplemental interrogatories. When the garnishee has answered the initial interrogatories propounded to him, however, permitting plaintiff to
propound supplemental interrogatories involves the danger that
plaintiff may be seeking to escape the task of formally traversing
the garnishee's answer but nevertheless indirectly accomplishing
the same result by propounding interrogatories based on the
knowledge he has gained from the answers of the garnishee.
When the court suspects that resort is made to such tactics, plaintiff will not be permitted to file supplemental interrogatories. 1 28
Relegating plaintiff to a traverse of garnishee's answers in such
case is sound. The requirement that the answers be traversed
is a safeguard afforded the garnishee against over-zealous plaintiffs. Where it is clear that plaintiff is not attempting to indirectly traverse the garnishee's answer, however, the courts
have permitted plaintiff to propound supplemental interrogatories. 29
The rules governing interrogatories propounded in garnishment process are not to be confused with the provisions of the
Code of Practice establishing the discovery device of interroga127. See page 490 infra.

128. Securities Finance Co. v. Phipp, 157 So. 747 (La. App. 1934). See Ober,
Nanson & Co. v. Matthews, 24 La. Ann. 90 (1.872) (court permitted additional
interrogatories to be filed when it was clear that the garnishee bank had made

errors in its answer. Plaintiff alleged he wished to give the bank an opportunity to
correct these errors rather than subject the bank to the embarrassment of having
its answers traversed).
129. Coleman, Britton & Withers v. Fennimore, 16 La. Ann. 253 (1861).
Garnishee answered further liability to defendant-contractor was contingent on
defendant completing the performance of the contract on designated day. During
appeal designated day arrived and Supreme Court remanded the case to trial court
to permit filing of supplemental interrogatories. See also Ober, Nanson and Co. v.

Matthews, 24 La. Ann. 90 (1872), note 128 aupra.
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tories under facts and articles. 30 It is probable that these provisions should not be construed in pari materia.131
Seizure. Under the provisions of the Code of Practice of
1870 and the proposed Code, seizure of defendant's property and
32
credits in the hands of the garnishee is constructive in nature
and is effected simply by the service of the petition, citation,
and interrogatories on the garnishee. 133 In contrast to the method
of effecting seizure under a writ of attachment or fieri facias
without more, property and credits are subjected to seizure under
garnishment process without the necessity of being selected and
identified by the sheriff as the specific assets which he causes
to be seized. By operation of law defendant's property and
credits in the garnishee's hands may be subjected to seizure even
though both plaintiff and the sheriff are unaware of their existence, 34 and in some cases even though the garnishee does not
believe he is indebted to defendant. 3 5 Due to the fact that the
constructive seizure effectively seizes every asset of defendant
in the garnishee's hands which is properly subject to seizure
under garnishment process, some limit must be placed on the
amount of property and credits seized in order to avoid unnecessary interference with the affairs of defendant. 13 6 Though
130. LA. R.S. 13:4870 (1950).
131. State v. Rightor, 49 La. Ann.
132. The seizure thus effected was
Stern & Co. v. E. Martin & Co., 132
Thomas,
21 CODE
La. Ann.
37 (1869).
" 133. LA
OF PRACTICE art. 246

696, 22 So. 245 (1897).
styled a "constructive" seizure in Lehman,
La. 231, 61 So. 212 (1913) and Matta v.

(1870) ; LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE,
PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOSt DES MOTIFS No. 15, Book IV, Execution of
Judgments art. 39 (1954). While Article 246 of the Code of Practice of 1870
mentions only the service of interrogatories, as previously indicated, valid seizure
cannot be made without the service of the petition and citation. Technically speaking, seizure takes place without service of the notice of seizure on the garnishee,
but as previously indicated at note 111 supra service of notice of seizure on the
garnishee is an indispensable requirement for effecting a valid seizure.
The statement is often made in the jurisprudence that no valid seizure can be
made unless at the time of the service of the interrogatories and other pleadings
on the garnishee the sheriff has in his hands the writ of attachment or fieri facias
on which the garnishment proceeding is based. See note 30 supra. The case of
Pollock v. Williams, 9 La. Ann. 460 (1854) would appear to hold that the garnishee may require proof of the issuance of a valid and subsisting writ as a prerequisite for effecting a valid service upon him.
134. See note 133 supra.
135. Amount owed defendant in dispute at time seizure effected and garnishee
even answered interrogatories to effect that there was no indebtedness. Later,
however, garnishee and defendant entered into a compromise, thus liquidating the
claim. Held, the compromise was an acknowledgment of the pre-existing indebtedness, and the acknowledgment relates back to the date of the seizure and the indebtedness is covered by the seizure. Appalachian Corp. of La. v. Compania General de Petroleo, 162 La. 774, 111 So. 160 (1927) ; Marchand v. Bell, 21 La. Ann.
33 (1869).
136. As a practical matter the draftsmen of the Code of Practice of 1870, and
the earlier garnishment act found in Act 53 of 1839 could not have intended that
this ancillary procedure should prove to be more harsh than seizure under a writ
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the proposed Code is silent on the point, under Article 256 and
other provisions of the Code of Practice of 1870, the aggregate
value of the assets seized in the garnishee's hands cannot ex-

ceed the amount of plaintiff's claim against defendant plus an
estimated amount to cover court costs, interest, and costs of
seizure and sale where such items may be incurred.8 7 Under
this rule the same amount of defendant's assets is permitted to
be seized under garnishment process, as is permitted in the case
where seizure is made under a simple writ of attachment or
fieri facias without the use of garnishment process. Thus if
plaintiff has obtained a $250 judgment against defendant and
under garnishment process seeks to execute that judgment
against defendant's $1000 bank account, the garnishee bank
should be lawfully entitled to honor withdrawals on defendant's
account so long as the account at no time decreases below an
amount necessary to pay the judgment and the interest which
may accrue thereon. If the garnishment process was issued as
an adjunct to a writ of attachment, the garnishee bank should
be lawfully entitled to honor withdrawals on defendant's account
so long as the account at on time decreases below the amount
18
claimed in the suit against the defendant.

The sheriff does not take the property and credits seized
of attachment or fieri jacias. Further, it would be completely untenable to hold
that it was intended that one who resorts to garnishment process should run the
risk of incurring damages for excessive seizure, e.g., under Article 642 of the Code
of Practice of 1870, simply because the garnishee happened to have assets belonging to defendant in excess of the claim which plaintiff has against defendant. On
the contrary, as previously indicated, the probable purpose of incorporating garnishment procedure into Louisiana law was to make possible a more effective and
safer seizure than was possible by effecting seizure under a simple writ of attachment of fieri facias.
137. Article 256 of the Code of Practice of 1870 provides: "The sheriff shall
. . . seize and detain so much of whatever property the debtor may possess within
the parish over which his powers extend . . . as may be equal in value to the
amount claimed in the suit." While this article is cast in terms applicable to
seizure under a writ of attachment without the use of garnishment process, viz.,
"seize and detain" defendant's property, reference is made in the article to notification of the garnishee "if there be such made party to the suit," and hence it may be
fairly said that the measure of property to be seized by the sheriff would be the
same in cases of attachment (garnishment). Article 642 authorizes garnishment
under writs of fieri fecias "in the manner and with the same regulations as are
provided in relation to garnishees in cases of attachment, and pursuant to special
laws."
It is to be noted that while Article 256 dealing with attachment authorizes
seizure in an amount equal in value to the amount claimed in the suit, Article 651,
dealing with fieri facias, provides: "The sheriff shall seize the property of the
debtor to a sufficient amount to discharge the judgment, as well as interests and
costs; he may even seize something beyond this amount, to pay the interest which
may become due, and the estimated costs of the seizure and sale." Hence, the
maximum amount of assets which may be seized under garnishment process differs
according to the particular writ on which the garnishment proceeding is based.
138. See note 137 aupra.
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from the garnishee's possession at the time of seizure. 3 9 Once

seizure is effected, the garnishee becomes the legal custodian
of the seized assets, and is obligated to hold them subject to the
order of the court. 140 These assets remain under seizure until
final disposition thereof is made by the court, unless for varying
14 1
reasons later to be noted they are earlier released from seizure.
As in the case of seizure under a writ of attachment or fieri
facias without the use of garnishment process, the act of seizure
operates to vest in plaintiff a privilege on the property and
42
credits seized.
With one statutory exception, 43 the settled rule under the
jurisprudence is that seizure can be effected only upon such
property and credits as are subject to seizure under garnishment process at the moment the interrogatories and other pleadings are served on the garnishee. 44 As to the individual garni139. Lehman Stern & Co. v. E. Martin & Co., 132 La. 231, 61 So. 212 (1913);
A. & J. Dennistoun & Co. v. N. Y. Croton & Steam F. Co., 6 La. Ann. 782 (1851);
Caldwell v. Townsend, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 307 (1827); Scholefield v. Bradlee, 8
Mart. (0.S.) 495 (1820). The garnishee cannot be ordered to deliver the property
or credits to the sheriff until after plaintiff has obtained judgment against defendant in the main demand. See generally page 502 infra.
140. King v. Cram, Gunby's Dec. 26 (1885); A. & J. Dennistoun & Co. v.
N.Y. Croton & Steam F. Co., 6 La. Ann. 782 (1851). If after seizure the garnishee
pays the money owed to defendant, or to another party, the garnishee makes himself liable to plaintiff for the sum paid. Citizens Bank v. Payne & Gilman, 21 La.
Ann. 380 (1869) ; Bean v. Mississippi Union Bank, 5 Rob. 333 (La. 1843).
141. See Dockham v. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 302 (1874).
142. LA CODE OF PRACTICE art. 722 (1870) ; Dockham v. New Orleans, 26
La. Ann. 302 (1874) ; Marchand v. Bell, 21 La. Ann. 33 (1869) (fieri facias).
Attachment of defendant's property gives plaintiff a privilege on the property and
credits seized from the moment of seizure provided plaintiff later procures judgment against defendant. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U. v. Hart, 210 La. 78, 26
So.2d 361 (1946). No cases were found applying this rule to garnishment under
a writ of attachment. The operation of this rule will not be affected, however,
by the fact that the attachment was effected via garnishment proceedings. This
case is codified as to both attachments and sequestration in LOUISIANA STATE
LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, ExposIt DES MOTIFS No. 15, Book
IV- Eoecution of Judgments art. 7 (1954). The priority among privileges placed
on the same property or credits is not changed by the fact that the seizure is made
under garnishment process rather than by a simple seizure under writ of attachment or fieri facias without more. See Gomilla v. Milliken, 41 La. Ann. 116, 5 So.
548 (1889); Dockman v. New Orleans, supra; Louisiana Oil Refining Corp. v.
Hammett, 145 So. 38 (La. App. 1932). Seizure may also operate to interrupt
prescription. See National Park Bank v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 159 La.
86, 105 So. 234 (1925).
143. When immovable property is seized, under Article 466 of the Civil Code
of 1870, the revenues and other fruits produced by the property during the seizure
are deemed to come under the seizure. See page 474 infra. When wages or salaries
are garnished, under LA. R.S. 13:3921,3927 (1950), unearned wages as well as
earned wages are deemed to come under the seizure. See page 506 infra.
144. Silverman v. Grinnell, 165 La. 587, 115 So. 789 (1928),; Humphrey v.
Midkiff, 122 La. 939, 48 So. 331 (1909) (garnishment of future wages was later
permitted by La. Acts 1932, No. 181) ; Murphy v. Thielen, 6 Rob. 288 (La. 1843) ;
Simon v. Hulse, 124 So. 845 (La. App. 1929). See also United States v. Feazel,
49 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. La. 1943), and Gomilla v. Milliken, 41 La. Ann. 116, 5
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shee, no authority exists in either the Code of Practice of 1870
or the proposed Code to afford the writ of attachment or fieri
facias power to place property and credit under seizure beyond
this point of time. 145 In the absence of such authority, and in
view of the harshness of devices which permit the seizure of
property belonging to another, the rule of the jurisprudence restricting the seizing power of these writs is sound. 46 It is to be
noted that this rule applies only to determine what property
and credits are seized in the hands of a particular garnishee,
and does not contravene the previously mentioned rule 1 47 that
during the life of a single writ of attachment or fieri facias,
plaintiff may cause several different parties to be made garnishees and thereby effectively seize property and credits belonging to defendant in the hands of each. Accordingly, property and
credits which come into the garnishee's hands subsequent to the
time the interrogatories and other pleadings were served on the
garnishee do not come under the seizure.148 The single exception
to the rule determining what property and credits are seized in
the garnishee's hands exists in the case where revenues or other
fruits are produced by immovable property during the period of
So. 548 (1889). See page 457 et seq. for the types of property and credits which
are subject to seizure.

145. Article 246 of the Code of Practice of 1870 provides in part: "The prop-

erty and effects in the possession of a third person, belonging to defendant, or
debts due by him to such defendant, shall be deemed to be levied as by the sheriff,
from the date of service of the interrogatories on such persons." Article 39 of the
of
Proposed Code of Practice, Expos6 des motifs No. 15, bk. IV -Execution
judgment- contains the language: "Seizure of such property or indebtedness under
garnishment shall take effect upon service of the petition, citation, and interrogatories." Neither of these provisions would fairly support an interpretation that
an extended duration of time is contemplated with which additional property and
credits coming into the garnishee's control should likewise come under the seizure.
146. Writs of attachment are stricti juris and all formalities and requirements
prescribed must be strictly complied with under pain of nullity. Lehman v. Broussard, 45 La. Ann. 346, 12 So. 504 (1893). This proposition is well settled. The
basic provisions for garnishment under the Code of Practice of 1870 are contained
in the section on attachments. Under Article 246 it is provided that garnishment
under fieri facia8 is to be conducted "in the same manner and with the same regulations as are provided in relation to garnishees in causes of attachment." Under
the provision of the proposed Code the situation is reversed and the basic provisions are treated in the section on Execution of Judgments. Article 30 of Expos6
des motifs No. 18, bk. VII, Special Proceedings, tit. I, Provisional Remedies, states
that except as otherwise provided, the provisions applicable to garnishment under
fieri facias apply also to garnishment under attachment or sequestration. It is
probable that the arrangement of the proposed Code has no substantive significance,
and that the only reason for the change in arrangement was recognition that in the
vast majority of cases garnishment is used in execution of money judgments. See
DRAKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUITS BY ATTACHMENT § 667 (4th ed. 1873).
147. See pages 457 and 466 supra.
148. Humphrey v. Midkiff, 122 La. 939, 48 So. 331 (1909) (garnishment of
future wages was later permitted by La. Acts 1932, No. 181) ; Simon v. Hulse,
124 So. 845 (La. App. 1929). See also United States v. Feazel, 49 F. Supp. 679
(W.D. La. 1943).
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time when the property is under seizure. Though such revenues
and other fruits accrue after the time of service of the interrogatories and other pleadings, under Article 466 of the Civil Code,
they are deemed to come under the seizure already effected. 14 9
This exception is of minor importance since immovable property
is ordinarily not seized under garnishment process.150 Since
Article 466 has no application to movable property, any dividends
or interest which might accrue from movable assets which are
commonly seized under garnishment process such as corporate
securities or deposits in savings accounts would be governed by
the general rule and would not be deemed to come under the
seizure.' 51
As a practical matter the amount of defendant's assets seized
in the hands of a single garnishee are usually insufficient to
satisfy the claim which plaintiff has against defendant. If plaintiff is aware of this before he brings the garnishment proceedings, he may cause several third persons to be cited as garnishees
at the same time'5 2 in order to seize an ample amount of defendant's assets as quickly as possible. This may become particularly advisable if it is feared that defendant may seek to
place his assets beyond plaintiff's reach. As will be developed
more fully hereafter, 158 this practice involves the possibility that
the total amount of assets seized will exceed that amount which
is necessary to satisfy plaintiff's claim against defendant. Although this situation seldom arises, the result is that plaintiff
exposes himself to liability in damages to defendant for excessive
seizure. In the case where the assets seized in the hands of a
single garnishee are insufficient to satisfy plaintiff's claim, or
where such a deficiency exists after several persons have been
149. LA CIVIL CODE art. 466 (1870). This provision applies to seizures under
either writ of attachment or writ of fieri facias. Posey v. Fargo, 187 La. 122, 174
So. 175 (1937) (attachment) ; New Orleans Compress Co. v. Katz, 185 La. 723,
170 So. 244 (1936) (fieri facias). In neither of these cases was seizure effected
under garnishment process. No garnishment cases were found involving the use of
Article 466. In light of garnishment process being only an ancillary proceeding,
however, it is probable that this provision applies equally well to seizures under
garnishment process. See also note 11 supra.
150. It is possible that occasion for the use of this article could arise in the
case where defendant had made a simulated sale of immovable property to the
garnishee and the garnishee failed to object to the use of garnishment process to
try the question of the ownership of the property. See page 480 infra.
151. Provisions for seizure under garnishment process are strictly construed.
See note 146 supra.
152. Though plaintiff asks in a single petition that two or more persons be
cited as garnishees, there is created a separate garnishment proceeding against
each garnishee. Neither garnishee is a party to any other proceeding than his
own. First Natchez Bank v. Moss, 52 La. Ann. 170, 26 So. 828 (1899).
153. See page 477 infra.
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cited as garnishees, plaintiff can still bring further garnishment
proceedings in an attempt to seize additional assets belonging to
defendant.
While property and credits coming into a garnishee's hands
subsequent to the service of the interrogatories and other pleadings ordinarily do not come under the seizure effected, plaintiff
may by supplemental petition have an additional garnishment
proceeding brought against the same garnishee and thereby
effect a new seizure which will reach such newly acquired assets
as are found in his hands. 5 4 Of course, bringing an additional
garnishment proceeding against the garnishee will not reach
newly acquired property and credits which the garnishee has
disposed of before the additional seizure is effected. The garnishee is not obligated to assist plaintiff in seizing defendant's
property and credits, nor is the garnishee bound to refrain from
cooperating with defendant in order to dispose of newly acquired
assets to prevent them from being seized in his hands.
If plaintiff wishes to cause additional third persons to be
cited as garnishees in order to supply the deficiency in the
amount of assets seized, he may do so by means of petition to
the proper court or courts according to the rules of venue. 155
Whenever seizure is made in the hands of two or more garnishees, however, the possibility arises that an excessive amount
of defendant's assets may be seized. 156 In the absence of special
instructions given by plaintiff to the sheriff, all the garnishable
assets in the hands of each garnishee cited are seized up to the
amount necessary to satisfy the claim which the petition states
plaintiff has against defendant, plus an amount for interest and
154. It is probable that plaintiff should allege in his petition that it is believed
that additional property and credits have come into the garnishee's hands since
seizure was effected under the previous garnishment proceedings. It would not be
necessary to procure an additional writ of fieri facias or attachment to effect the
second seizure if the original writ was still valid and subsisting. If the writ has
expired or has otherwise been returned by the sheriff, it would be necessary to
procure the issuance of an additional writ under which the seizure could be effected.
See page 471 supra.
155. See page 452 et seq. supra.
156. Apparently the only reported case on this problem is Lovell v. Cartwright,
17 La. 547 (1841). In this case, when an insufficiency resulted from seizure in
the hands of the first garnishee, a second garnishee was cited who failed to answer
the interrogatories. Although the service of pleading on ,the -second garnishee was
defective, and therefore no seizure effected, the court noted in dictum that -had
the second garnishee been cast in judgment pro confe8so, it would have been entitled to a deduction or credit for the proceeds which had previously been attached
in the hands of the first garnishee. The court in effect recognizes that the amount
of assets for which the second garnishee was accountable was the amount claimed
by plaintiff in the petition.
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various costs if garnishment is under a writ of fieri facias.1 57
This is the necessary result stemming from the nature of the
constructive seizure effected under garnishment process in which
assets are seized without being selected and identified by the
sheriff at the time of seizure. While defendant may suffer only
nominal damages because of excessive seizure, the likelihood that
substantial damages may be incurred is enhanced by the fact
that the defendant is not entitled to receive notice that seizure
has been made in the hands of the garnishees. 158 In the case
where seizures have already been made under garnishment
process and plaintiff knows the amount of defendant's assets
which he has seized, at least two protective measures would be
available to plaintiff to permit him to make an additional seizure
under garnishment process without incurring the risk of damages for excessive seizure. 159 The safest precaution is to state
in the petition for the citation of the additional party as garnishee that designated assets belonging to defendant have already
been seized. A second protective measure is to inform the sheriff
before he cites the additional party as garnishee that certain
assets have already been seized and that he should seize only so
much of defendant's assets in the garnishee's hand as is necessary to satisfy the deficiency. 160 It is to be recognized, of course,
that the problems involved in effecting an excessive seizure are
largely academic, and are not likely to arise in practice.
Despite the ability of the constructive seizure effected under
garnishment process to subject to seizure all the garnishable
assets in the garnishee's hands, it must be noted that various
practical and procedural difficulties may prevent plaintiff from
effectively subjecting the assets seized to the satisfaction of his
claim.
Plaintiff obtains the maximum benefits from garnishment
process when the garnishee makes responsive and truthful an157. See note 137 supra. This is the only result that can be derived from Article 256 of the Code of Practice of 1870. The amount which plaintiff claims from
defendant must appear in the petition or in the interrogatories. See note 97 supra.
158. See note 117 supra.
159. There would appear to be no danger of excessive seizure in the case where
only one person has been made garnishee, and plaintiff wishes to bring additional
garnishment proceedings against the same garnishee to seize assets which have
come into the latter's possession subsequent to the initial seizure. It would appear
unreasonable to assume that more was demanded of the garnishee than the amount
claimed in the suit no matter how many times that garnishee was cited. A different
problem would arise, however, if assets had been seized in the hands of another
person before the garnishee was garnished the second time.
160. The sheriff could designate in the notice of seizure served on the garnishee
the amount of assets which he seizes in the latter's hands. See note 137 supra.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

478

[Vol. XVIII

swers. Untruthful and incomplete answers made in a manner
which prevents detection result in the seizure of little or no
assets which in contemplation of law have been made available
to the plaintiff.
Release of seizure. As previously noted, property and credits
seized under garnishment process are not taken from the
garnishee at the time of seizure, but remain in the garnishee's
hands until the latter is ordered by the court to deliver them to
the sheriff. Since the property and credits seized in the garnishee's hands belong to the defendant, the general rule is that
only defendant is entitled to post bond and obtain release of the
seized assets. 161 As the garnishee is the legal custodian of the
property and credits seized, in some instances defendant may
find no practical advantage in obtaining the release of the assets.
When defendant deems it advantageous to obtain the release of
the assets seized, however, he has the right to do so. 1 62 Defend-

ant need not wait to obtain the release of the assets until after
the garnishee has answered the interrogatories propounded him
and the plaintiff has learned the identity of the property and
credits seized. If defendant wishes to free the assets from seizure
as quickly as possible, he may post the required bond immediately
after seizure has been effected, and before the garnishee has
answered.1 63 In such cases, if defendant leaves in the garnishee's
hands the assets which have been released, the fact that the
assets have been seized and then released from seizure does not
relieve the garnishee from the obligation of answering the inter6 4
rogatories.1
If defendant obtains the release of the assets into
his own possession, however, the garnishee is relieved from the
obligation of answering the interrogatories and the garnishment
proceeding is terminated. 165 This is based on the premise that
since defendant has posted bond for the release of the assets,
161.

Release of goods seized under attachment: LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art.

259 (1870); LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE,
Exposl DES MOTIFS No. 18, Book VII, Special Proceedings, tit. 1, art. 7, Provisional Remedies (1954). That defendant has the right to post bond to release
assets attached under garnishment process has been recognized in Brown & Co. v.
Richardson, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 210 (La. 1823) ; Lecesne v. Cottin, 10 Mart.(O.S.)
174 (1821). Release of goods seized under fieri facias: LA. R.S. 13:3411 (1950).
162. See note 161 supra. Where defendant is unable to post bond to free the
property seized in the hands of the garnishee, it has been held that defendant may
take a rule on plaintiff and garnishee contradictorily to show cause why the assets
should not be turned over to the sheriff and be .held by the sheriff pending the
litigation. Rochereau & Co. v. Guidry, 24 La. Ann. 294 (1872).
163. Brown & Co. v. Richardson, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 210 (La. 1823).
164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.
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and plaintiff has consented to the sufficiency of the surety on
the bond, both parties to the suit have taken the property and
credits out of the garnishee's hands, and hence there is no longer
any reason for the garnishment proceeding to continue. It would
appear to be clear, however, that before defendant could have
released into his own possession the assets seized in the garnishee's hands, defendant's claim to the assets must entitle defendant to possession as against the garnishee.
The only exceptions to the rule that only defendant may post
bond and obtain the release of assets seized under garnishment
process arise when garnishment is made under a writ of attachment. 16 6 The garnishee under a writ of attachment may post
bond and obtain the release of those assets seized in his hands
1 67
which he holds under pledge or consignment from defendant.
If plaintiff withdraws garnishment proceedings, seized assets
in the hands of the garnishee are automatically released. Additionally, assets of defendant which are not admitted in the answer are released from seizure if the delay for traversing ex68
pires.
Procedural and Substantive Rights of the Garnishee
For the protection of his interests the garnishee is afforded
certain rights which may be classified as: the right to ordinary
process; the right to be proceeded against according to the rules
of procedure prescribed for garnishment process; the right to
assert defenses which he has against the defendant; and the
right to protection against double liability. These rights will be
separately treated in subsequent sections of the paper.
The garnishee occupies the position of a stakeholder whose
only responsibilities are to answer truthfully the interrogatories,
to support his answers should they be traversed, and to pay or
deliver the property and credits in his hands to whomever the
166. It is to be noted that the proposed Code contains provisions which will
authorize garnishment under a writ of sequestration. If these provisions are adopted by the Legislature, a second group of exceptions will be created. See note 158
infra.
167. LA. R.S. 13:3941 (1950) ; LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED
CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOSE DES MOTIFS No. 18, Book VII, Special Proceedings,

art. 9, tit. 1, Provisional Remedies (1954). These provisions apply also to the
writ of sequestration.
168. LA. R.S. 13:3911 (1950) ; Johnson v. Bolt, 146 So. 375 (La. App. 1933)
LOUISIANA

STATE

LAW

INSTITUTE,

PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE,

MOTIFS No.. 15, Book IV, art. 42, Execution of Judgments (1954).
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court may order. 1 9 As a stakeholder, the garnishee must stand
aloof from the claims which all other parties have to the prop-

erty and credits in his hands. He may not inquire into the merits
of the controversy between plaintiff and defendant'7 0 and cannot
oppose the garnishment proceeding brought against him by
showing that plaintiff's claim against defendant is invalid,' 7' or
that defendant has a defense which defeats the claim. 7 2 Similarly, the garnishee may not champion the rights of the creditors
of defendant, 73 nor the rights of another garnishee, 174 nor those
of an intervener in the garnishment proceeding. 175 The only
legitimate concern of the garnishee is to protect his own interests.
Right to ordinary process. As will be subsequently seen,
due to the status of the garnishee as a stakeholder, fewer procedural safeguards are afforded the garnishee than are accorded
a defendant in suits conducted under ordinary process. Therefore, when the plaintiff asserts demands of a character which
cannot be adequately tried in garnishment proceedings, the garnishee has a right to be proceeded against according to the rules
for ordinary process. 7 6 Plaintiffs commonly resort to such tac169. Johnson v. Murphy, 124 La. 143, 49 So. 1007 (1909) ; Schindler v. Smith,
Bullins & Co., 18 La. Ann. 476 (1866) ; Hazard v. Agricultural Bank, 11 Rob.
326 (La. 1845) ; Bean v. Mississippi Union Bank, 5 Rob. 333 (La. 1843) ; Frazier
v. Wilcox, 4 Rob. 517 (La. 1843) ; Kimball v. Plant, 14 La. 511 (1840) ; Manuel
Motor Co. v. Graham, 69 So.2d 64 (La. App. 1953) ; Goodwin v. Southern Kraft
Corp., 6 So.2d 783 (La. App. 1942).
170. Johnson v. Murphy, 124 La. 143, 49 So. 1007 (1909) ; Brode v. Fire Ins.
Co. of New Orleans, 8 Rob. 244 (La. 1844) ; Frazier v. Willcox, 4 Rob. 517 (La.
1843) ; Lee & Hardy v. Palmer, 18 La. 405 (1841).
171. Brode v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of New Orleans, 8 Rob. 244 (La. 1844).
172. Whitney Central Trust & S. Bank v. Norton, 157 La. 199, 102 So. 306
(1924) (property exempt from seizure) ; Frasier & Adams v. Banks, 11 La. Ann.
31 (1856) (debt discharged by bankruptcy) ; Goodwin v. Southern Kraft Corp.,
6 So.2d 783 (La. App. 1942) (wages exempt from seizure). Contra, Smith v.
Paderas, 1 Orl. App. 239 (La. App. 1904).
173. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp. v. Hammett, 145 So. 38 (La. App. 1932).
174. First Natchez Bank v. Moss, 52 La. Ann. 170, 26 So. 828 (1899).
175. Lee & Hardy v. Palmer, 18 La. 405 (1841).
176. The foundation cases are Taylor v. Whittemore, 2 Rob. 99 (La. 1842)
Laville v. H6brard, 1 Rob. 435 (La. 1842); Samory v. Hbrard, 17 La. 555
(1841) (attempts to substitute garnishment process for the revocatory action).
Garnishment proceedings cannot be used as a substitute for a revocatory action:
Pelican Well Tool & Supply Co.v. Smith, 176 La. 896, 147 So. 27(1933) ;Wilkinson
v. Macbeca, 158 La. 183, 103 So. 733 (1925) ; Rice Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Saunders, 130 La. 627, 58 So. 413 (1912); Threefoot Bros. Co. v. Richardson, 127
La. 364, 53 So. 652 (1910) ; Liminet v. Fourchy, 51 La. Ann. 1299, 26 So. 87
(1899) ; Ivens v. E. M. Ivens Co., 30 La. Ann. 249 (1878) ; Hodges v. Graham,
Hodges & Co., 25 La. Ann. 365 (1873) ; Thompson v. New Orleans Coast & Lafourche Transp. Co., 24 La. Ann. 384 (1872) ; Battles v. Simmons, 21 La. Ann.
416 (1869) ; Copley v. Dosson, 3 La. Ann. 651 (1848) ; Smith v. McCall, 122 So.
149 (La. App. 1929).
In Laville v. H6brard, 1 Rob. 435 (La. 1842), plaintiff's right to assert a
revocatory action had prescribed and plaintiff attempted to assert that action
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tics in an attempt to bring indirectly a revocatory action against
the garnishee when the latter's answers to the interrogatories
propounded him set up a claim of ownership 177 in property which
plaintiffs suspect actually belongs to defendant. If plaintiff were
permitted to do so, he could on traverse of the garnishee's answers, introduce evidence attacking the garnishee's title, and in
this manner try the question of title without the necessity of
meeting the strict substantive requirements of the revocatory
action,178 and perhaps more important, due to short notice given
the garnishee to appear in court to contest the traverse, 179 without the garnishee having had adequate time within which to
prepare his defense. Much the same problem arises in cases
where plaintiff traverses the garnishee's answers in an attempt
indirectly by garnishment process.
But there is no objection to the plaintiff's traverse of the answers in the garnishment proceeding if at the same time plaintiff brings a revocatory action against
the garnishee and defendant for annulment of the contract. Oliver, Voorhies &
Lowery v. Majors, 133 La. 764, 63 So. 323 (1913).
In Bank of Baldwin v. Broussard, 119 So. 567 (La. App. 1929), the first garnishee answered that he held goods belonging to defendant subject to an order of
delivery in favor of one Banta. Banta was then made garnishee. In an attempt
to force plaintiff to resort to the action in declaration of a simulation Banta
answered that he owned the rice. To avoid circuity of actions the court permitted
plaintiff to rule defendant and both garnishees into court to show cause why the
rice delivery should not be deemed a simulation. Cf. First National Bank of
Ruston v. Lagrove, 166 La. 626, 117 So. 741 (1928). These two cases appear to
be distinguishable from the general rule since they involved simulation wherein no
title passes.
This rule is alluded to in the cases of Lowery v. Zorn, 184 La. 1054, 168 So.
297 (1936) and Liminet v. Fourchy, 51 La. Ann. 1299, 26 So. 87 (1899). In
neither of these cases, however, did the court deny the trial of the garnishee's
liability in the garnishment proceeding. In the Lowery case a dispute existed between the garnishee-insurance company and defendant, the garnishee's liability
turning solely on the determination of the question of whether in fact passengers
riding in a vehicle were riding free of charge or were passengers for hire. The
court thought this narrow question could be determined as well in the garnishment proceeding as it could have been in a direct action against the insurer. In
the Lirninet case the garnishee failed to object timely to the form of procedure,
and there was further suspicion on the part of the court that the defendant and
plaintiff were in collusion so that defendant was in effect suing the garnishee indirectly in the name of plaintiff and was seeking to establish the alleged indebtedness by his (defendant's) own testimony as a witness for plaintiff. In this connection see Peet, Yale & Bowling v. J. J. McDaniel & Co., 27 La. Ann. 455 (1875)
(suit for damages in progress between defendant and garnishee and plaintiff
brought garnishment proceedings against garnishee).
177. "The doctrine that garnishment cannot be substituted for the revocatory
action is applicable only to cases where the title of the defendant has been apparently divested by a contract in due form." Commercial Bank of Alexandria v.
Shanks, 129 La. 861, 865, 56 So. 1028, 1029 (1912) (doctrine does not apply when
garnishee claims the property was pledged to him).
178. For example, the requirements that plaintiff show fraud on the part
of the debtor (Lowenberg Martin & Co. v. Newman, 142 La. 959, 77 So. 891
(1918)), and the requirement that plaintiff prove the contract was injurious to
him (LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 1978 (187Q); Taylor v. Whittemore, 2 Rob. 99 (La.
1842) )..
179. Often only a period of from three to five days is allowed.
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toestablish that the garnishee is indebted to defendant when such
indebtedness is the subject of bona fide dispute between the garnishee and defendant. Such disputes may exist, for example,
over the liability of the garnishee arising out of an alleged breach
of a contract in force between the garnishee and defendant.
The garnishee's right to ordinary process is not absolute,
however, and he can avail himself of this right only if before
the trial of the traverse 80 the garnishee files an exception objecting to the trial of the issues under garnishment process. 181
Failure of the garnishee to file this exception timely operates to
waive his right to ordinary process and may materially prejudice
his interests.

82

The right to be proceeded against according to the rules
of procedure prescribed for garnishment process. If plaintiff is not in all respects entitled to bring a garnishment
proceeding, the garnishee can cause the proceeding to be dismissed. Thus, if there is no valid writ of attachment or fieri
facias to support the proceeding,8 8 or in the case of garnishment
under writ of fieri facias, if plaintiff does not have a valid judgment against the defendant, the garnishee may file a peremptory
exception and have the proceeding dismissed.8 4 When the defect
is not discovered until after judgment has been rendered against
the garnishee, the latter may rule plaintiff into court to show
cause why the judgment should not be set aside. 8 5 If plaintiff
does not conform to the rules prescribed for the conduct of garnishment proceedings, the garnishee may object to the use of
such improper procedure. 86 Thus, the garnishee may file an
exception to the right of plaintiff to propound supplemental interrogatories when the interrogatories are being used as a substitute for a traverse of the garnishee's answers. 8 7 Similarly,
.180. Rice Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Saunders, 130 La. 627, 58 So. 413 (1912).
181. Wuerpel v. Sinnot, 147 La. 1099, 86 So. 558 (1920) ; Liminet v. Fourchy,
51 La. Ann. 1299, 26 So. 87 (1899) ; Carter Bros. & Co. v. Galloway & Burns,
36 La. Ann. 730 (1884); Meyer v. Deffarage, 30 La. Ann. 548 (1878). This
exception should be written. Carter Bros. & Co. v. Galloway & Burns, 36 La. Ann.
730 (1884) ; Florance v. Yorke, 2 La. Ann. 995 (1847).
182. Ibid.
183. See page 450 supra.
184. Johnson v. Murphy, 124 La. 143, 49 So. 1007 (1909) (plaintiff's judgment null because defendant was an unrepresented minor) ; Hiriart v. Hardy, 152
So. 333 (La. App. 1934) (no citation of defendant). See also- Pollock v. Williams,
9 La. Ann. 460 (1854).
185. Raboteau v. Baleton, 11 Rob. 218 (La. 1845).
186. Featherston'h v. Compton, 3 La. Ann. 380 (1848) (exception to venue).
187. Securities Finance Co. v. Phipp, 157 So. 747 (La. App. 1934). See page
499 infra.
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if plaintiff's interrogatories contain questions foreign to the liability of the garnishee to defendant, the garnishee may file an
exception objecting to such interrogatories.'85 By the same token,
if a rule to traverse the garnishee's answers does not fully disclose the grounds on which the traverse is based, an exception
of vagueness may properly be filed by the garnishee. 8 9 Exceptions to improper process are usually dilatory in nature, and
hence will be waived unless filed in limine litis.190
The right to assert defenses which the garnishee has
against defendant. The garnishee is entitled to assert all defenses against plaintiff in the garnishment proceeding that the
garnishee could assert in a suit brought directly by defendant.' 91
This rule apparently admits of no exceptions. Thus, if, under
the terms of a loan, a bank has credited money to defendant's
account to be used only for designated purposes, the bank can
set up the restrictions placed on the use of the funds as a defense
192
to a garnishment proceeding brought by defendant's creditor.
Right to protection of claims which the garnishee has against
the defendant. When the garnishee has a claim against the defendant, liquidated and equally demandable with the claim which
the defendant has against the garnishee, the latter may plead
this in compensation in garnishment proceedings. 93 But if the
claim of the garnishee is disputed by the defendant, or undefined
either as to amount or as to facts from which the court can
determine the amount, the garnishment proceeding is not the
appropriate setting for a trial of the plea. 9 4 Under such circumstances proof adduced by the garnishee to establish his
188. First National Bank v. Moss, 52 La. Ann. 170, 26 So. 828 (1899) ; State
National Bank v. Boatner, 39 La. Ann. 843, 2 So. 589 (1887) ; Maudel and Conte
v. Mousseau, 28 La. Ann. 691 (1876).
189. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Dresser, 145 La. 133, 81 So. 875 (1919)
(exception of vagueness to rule to show cause why judgment pro confesso should
not be rendered) ; Florance v. Yorke, 2 La. Ann. 995 (1847) (plaintiff required
to disclose the specific property which he expected to prove in the possession of
the garnishee).
190. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Myrtle Grove Syrup Co., 175 La. 969, 144
So. 730 (1932). The Supreme Court early took the position that exceptions to
garnishment proceedings must be in writing. Carter Bros. & Co. v. Galloway &
Burns, 36 La. Ann. 730 (1884) ; Florance v. Yorke, 2 La. Ann. 995 (1847).
191. Monroe Grocer Co. v. J. A. Perdue & Co., 123 La. 375, 48 So. 1002
(1909) ; James v. Fellowes & Co., 20 La. Ann. 116 (1868) (defense of prescription). See also Liminey v. Fourchey, 51 La. Ann. 1299, 26 So. 87 (1899).
192. Cargill v. Otwell, 3 La. App. 197 (1925).
193. Monroe Grocer Co. v. J. A. Perdue & Co., 123 La. 375, 48 So. 1002 (1909).
See also Consolidated Co. v. Rayne, 167 La. 593, 120 So. 18 (1929) ; First Nat.
Bank of Leesville v. Martin, 127 La. 733, 53 So. 973 (1911) : Daigle v. Bird, 22
La. Ann. 138 (1870). Contra, Blanchard v. Cole, 8 La. 160 (1835).
194. Liminey v. Fourchey, 51 La. Ann. 1299, 26 So. 87 (1899).
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claim would not bind the defendant either as to the findings of
the court or by the decree declaring the garnishee's claim in
compensation. 5
If the garnishee has a privilege on the assets in his hands
which belong to defendant, though the assets are not for this
reason exempt from seizure, the existence and priority of the
privilege will be recognized if (in the garnishee's answers to
the interrogatories propounded him) he asserts his claim to the
privilege and indicates that the privilege attached to the property prior to its seizure by the sheriff in the garnishment proceeding. 19
The right to protection against double liability. The courts
use every available means to protect the garnishee against
the possibility that he may be required to pay the same debt
twice. In one early case in which the assets in the garnishee's
hands had previously been seized by another of defendant's creditors, the garnishee filed answers admitting that it had assets
belonging to defendant but made no mention of the previous attachment. Despite the garnishee's carelessness, when the plaintiff ruled the garnishee into court to show cause why the assets
should not be condemned to pay plaintiff's claim against defendant, the court protected the garnishee against double recovery by permitting him to contradict his answers by showing
17
that the assets had in fact been previously attached by another.
While the court may have gone far in protecting the garnishee
against the consequence of his own carelessness, there are situations in which even the careful and well-advised garnishee will
be exposed to double liability unless he is afforded protection.
Such a situation exists where the garnishee knows or fears that
some party other than defendant may have an interest in the
assets which have been seized in his hands, and payment to the
creditor of the defendant would not protect the garnishee from
a subsequent claim by the third party. In such cases, the courts
afford the garnishee two alternative courses of action: the garnishee may require plaintiff to bring the third party into the
garnishment proceeding for the purpose of having his rights
195. Ibid.
196. McRae, Coffman & Co. v. Austin, 9 La. Ann. 360 (1854). In this case
the garnishee intervened in the suit between plaintiff and defendant and set up
his privilege in the character of an intervenor. The court found that the attachment
levied by plaintiff when the garnishee was cited primed the garnishee's privilege
due to the latter's failure to assert his privilege by answer in the garnishment proceeding. See also Gardiner v. Smith, 12 La. 370 (1838).
197. Robeson v. Mississippi & Alabama R.R., 13 La. 465 (1839).
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determined, or the garnishee may convoke a concursus proceeding in which the plaintiff and the third person are cited to
appear and assert their claim to the assets. 198
A garnishee is likewise subjected to the danger of double
liability when the debt he owes defendant has been previously
seized by process issuing from judicial proceedings currently

being conducted in another state. Here the court can exercise
no control over the nonresident claimants to the assets. The outof-state proceeding may be a garnishment proceeding brought
by a creditor of defendant, or it may be a suit brought by defendant himself to enforce payment of the debt. In such cases

the Louisiana courts have held that in order to protect the garnishee the Louisiana court in which the garnishment proceeding
is pending should either suspend all further proceedings until
final disposition of the prior claim by the out-of-state court, or
permit plaintiff to prosecute his garnishment proceeding to
judgment on the condition that adequate security be given the
garnishee to indemnify him against loss should the out-of-state

court order him to pay the debt.199 Dictum in one recent case
198. First State Bank v. Burton, 222 La. 1030, 64 So.2d 421 (1953). Where
the garnishee adduces evidence to show that debt sought to be garnished is payable
to a third person and not to defendant in the principal action, the disclosure itself
is sufficient to protect the garnishee, and it devolves upon plaintiff to bring in
such party if he desires to test the validity of the garnishee's claim. Airey &
Stouse v. Hoke, 164 La. 998, 115 So. 60 (1927) ;Edward Thompson Co. v. Durand,
124 La. 381, 50 So. 407 (1909). But cf. Relf & Co. v. Boro, 17 La. Ann. 258
(1865) ; Hazard v. Agricultural Bank, 11 Rob. 326 (1845) (no interest in third
party assignee as to require him to be brought into the garnishment proceeding,
nor to make it unsafe to the garnishee to pay as ordered). See also Brown V.
Lowe & Pattison, 5 La. Ann. 34 (1850) (plaintiff was also garnishee under a
garnishment proceeding previously brought by defendant) and Smith v. Paderas,
1 Orl. App. 239 (La. App. 194).
For his own protection the garnishee has a right to institute an inquiry into
whether he can pay to plaintiff without subjecting himself to double liability.
Allard v. DeBrot, 15 La. 253 (1840).
199. Woodruff and Co. v. French, 6 La. Ann. 62 (1851). This view is supported by the earlier Louisiana cases of Broadnax v. Thomason, 1 La. Ann. 382
(1846) ; Frazier v. Willcox, 4 Rob. 517 (La. 1843) (principle recognized, but not
applied since the first claim had ceased to be prosecuted) ; Carrol v. McDonough,
10 Mart.(O.S.) 609 (La. 1822) (the foundation case).
In the recent case of Isaac v. Comision Reguladora Del Mercado de Henequen,
204 La. 1, 13, 14, 16, 14 So.2d 865, 869, 870 (1943), the court was apparently
not aware of the above cited cases when in dictum the court spoke of the proper
action to be taken by the court in the situation discussed in the following terms:
" 'There is a conflict among the authorities as to the proper course to be pursued
by the respective courts. It is held by one line of the authorities that the court
which first acquires jurisdiction over the debt has the right to maintain it to the
end of the litigation, and enforce or subject the debt, irrespective of the proceedings in the other court; and that the court which last acquires jurisdiction as to
the debt, whether it be by the action of the creditor to recover his debt or under
a garnishment by his creditor, must dismiss the action or garnishment, when the
pendency of the prior action or garnishment is duly brought to its notice. [citing
cases] The other line of the authorities holds that whether the action by the
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indicates that the court might favor a third solution as being
most satisfactory from the standpoint of both the garnishee and
plaintiff: permit plaintiff to prosecute the garnishment proceedings to judgment, but order a stay of execution on the judgment
so obtained until the out-of-state proceeding is determined.
Under this alternative procedure, upon the determination of the
out-of-state proceeding the court may order that the stay be re-

moved or be made perpetual, in whole or in part, as the exigency
of the case may require. 20 0 If before the Louisiana garnishment
proceeding has been brought, the out-of-state court has rendered
judgment against the garnishee ordering him to pay the debt,
the latter judgment, if entitled to full faith and credit, is available to the garnishee as a defense to the garnishment proceed20
ing. 1
THE ANSWER

The citation naming the third party as garnishee directs him
to answer the interrogatories. 202 The time within which the
garnishee may file his answers will be treated below. The answer
must be made by the garnishee himself, or by the garnishee's
creditor to recover his debt or the garnishment be first commenced, the court in
which the action by the creditor is pending should, upon due notice of the garnishment, either suspend all proceedings in the action to await the determination of
the garnishment, or, which is deemed better, proceed to judgment on the debt,
with a stay of execution on the judgment until the garnishment is determined,
which stay can be removed or made perpetual, in whole or in part, as the exigency
of the case may require. By this course the rights of the attaching creditor would
not be injuriously affected, and the garnishee would at the same time be effectively
protected against a double liability. [citing cases] . . . In the instant case this
court . .. is not called upon to decide which of the above-mentioned two conflicting courses is proper where actions involving the same debt are pending in different jurisdictions.' " It is to -be noted that the previously mentioned cases indicate
that the view adopted in Louisiana is the latter view mentioned by the court in
the Isaac case dictum. It is reasonable to assume that when the situation is presented to the court again, this is the view that will be followed.
200. Isaac v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 204 La. 1, 14
So.2d 865 (1943).
201. Ibid. But if the out-of-state suit is still pending at the time the Louisiana
garnishment proceeding is brought, for the garnishee to be able to urge a judgment
rendered by the out-of-state court the garnishee must have as a defense to the
garnishment proceeding taken all necessary steps to prevent recovery against himself in the out-of-state court. For a listing of the steps the garnishee is required
to take, see the Isaac case supra.
202. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 252 (1870). But if before the answer can be
filed, the defendant posts bonds to obtain the release of the property seized in the
garnishee's hands, the court order requiring the garnishee to deliver the property
excuses the garnishee from the necessity of answering the interrogatories. Brown
& Co. v. Richardson, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 210 (La. 1823).
The garnishee may be privileged not to answer one or more of the interroga.
tories. Shanghnessy v. Fogg, 15 La. Ann. 330 (1860) (garnishee attorney claimed
attorney-client privilege). The answers of a garnishee to interrogatories are evidence against the party who propounds the interrogatories. Cator v. H. B. Merril
& Co., 16 La. Ann. 137 (1861).
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agent if he has been expressly authorized to answer interrogatories by the garnishee. 2 3 In the absence of instructions by the

court to the contrary, the garnishee must answer the interrogatories on oath before a notary20 4 and file them with the clerk of
court within the permissible delay. 20 5 The practice of requiring
the garnishee to answer in open court is seldom used. 20 6 The
answers of the garnishee are presumed to be truthful, and are
20 7
entitled to full credit until they are successfully traversed.
Time within which answers may be filed; failure of
the garnishee to answer. Under the provisions of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870, the garnishee is allowed the
same delay within which to file his answers as is permitted for
filing answers in ordinary suits. 208 This usually allows the garnishee a period of ten days. 20 9 Failure of the garnishee to file his answers within this delay2 10 entitles plaintiff to seek judgment pro
203. The case of Zenero v. Pressey, 1 La. App. 347 (1924) indicates that the
garnishee can be bound by the answers of an agent duly authorized to answer the
interrogatories, citing the case of Lewis v. Franks, 18 La. Ann. 564 (1866). The
Lewis case in turn was based on the decision in Dickson & Co. v. Morgan, 6 La.
Ann. 562 (1851). It is to be noted that this last case was subsequently appealed
and in Dickson & Co. v. Morgan, 7 La. Ann. 490, 491 (1852) the court held: "The
power of answering interrogatories on oath, we do not think can be conferred by
one person on another." (Emphasis added.) The decision on appeal in this case
seems to have escaped the attention of the courts in the later decisions on the
point; and, in view of the intervening jurisprudence, it seems likely that the
courts will continue to hold that an agent can be clothed with authority to answer
the interrogatories.
204. State v. Rightor, 49 La. Ann. 696, 22 So. 245 (1897).
205. When the clerk of court has lost the answers filed with him by the garnishee the nature of the answers may be proved by parol evidence. Taylor &
Knapp v. McGee, 19 La. Ann. 374 (1867). Failure of the clerk to mark the answers "filed" or to enter the filing on the docket, and the failure of the garnishee
to pay the filing fee, will prevent a judgment pro confesso when the answers were
actually placed in the case record in the clerk's office. Livingston Finance Corp.
v. Baudin, 120 So. 401 (La. App. 1929).
206. Whether the garnishee is to be required to answer in open court rests in
the discretion of the court. See page 406 supra.
207. Henry v. Bew, 43 La. Ann. 476, 9 So. 101 (1891). See also the cases
cited in note 231 infra.
208. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 252, 262 (1870). As will be noted later, the
delay is expressly set at fifteen days under the provisions of the proposed Code.
See page 497 infra.
209. Victoria Lumber Co. v. Woodson, 127 So. 95 (La. App. 1930) (calculation of the delay within which to answer).
210. Carelessness or other error on the part of the garnishee or his agents is
no excuse for failing to answer. Warren v. Copp, 48 La. Ann. 810, 19 So. 746
(1896) (employee of the garnishee told to take the answers to the courthouse for
filing but failed to do so) ; Landry v. Dickson, 7 La. Ann. 238 (1852) (garnishee
not warranted in taking the word of the sheriff that since garnishee had no assets
belonging to defendant he need not answer) ; Comstock v. Paie, 18 La. 479 (1841)
(no attorney-client privilege found under circumstances to excuse the failure to
answer).
But if the failure to answer is caused by "some unforeseen event or accident
or fraud which has not been brought about through the agency" of the garnishee,
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confesso against the garnishee. 211 A judgment pro confesso is an

interlocutory decree which, as a matter of law, deems the garnishee's failure to answer a confession that he has sufficient assets

in his hands to satisfy plaintiff's claim. 212 The expiration of the
legal delay for answering does not, however, automatically prevent the garnishee from subsequently filing his answers. Due
to judicial dislike for the harshness of the judgment pro confesso,

the courts have liberally interpreted the provisions of the Code to
enable the garnishee of right to file his answers any time before
motion is made by the plaintiff for judgment pro confesso in
garnishment proceedings under fieri facias.213 When the garnishment proceeding is based on a writ of attachment, even
though judgment pro confesso may have been rendered against
the garnishee, the latter may nevertheless file his answers any

time before plaintiff obtains a judgment against defendant on
the main demand.2 14 Under some circumstances, as will be later
seen, even after these periods have expired, the court in its discretion will set the judgment aside and permit the garnishee to
file his answers. 215 When the garnishee files his answers with
the, clerk of court, the clerk must promptly serve on plaintiff
21 6
written notice that the answers have been filed.
Responsiveness of the answer. The garnishee is required to

make a fair and categorical answer to each interrogatory propounded.2 1 7

The detail with which an interrogatory must be

the failure to arrive is excused and judgment pro confesso will not be rendered
against the garnishee. Warren v. Copp, supra.
211. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 263 (1870); LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOS4t DES MOTIFS No. 15, Book IV, Erecution of Judgments art. 41 (1954) ; Humphrey v. Midkiff, 122 La. 939, 48 So. 331
(1909) ; Landry v. Dickson, 7 La. Ann. 238 (1852) ; Blanchard v. Vargas, 18 La.
486 (1841).
212. See generally page 494 et seq.
213. Victoria Lumber Co. v. Woodson, 127 So. 95 (La. App. 1930) ; Copley v.
Dosson, 3 La. Ann. 651 (1848). But of. Elder v. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 606 (1856),
where the court held that though the interlocutory decree holding the interrogatories confessed had been rendered, the garnishee could obtain a rescission of this
decree and be permitted to file his answers, if before the court renders the judgment against the garnishee ordering him to deliver up the assets the garnishee
produces an affidavit of surprise giving a satisfactory explanation of the failure to
answer on time. See also Copley v. Snow, 4 La. Ann. 521 (1849).
214. Rose & McCarthy v. Whaley & Edwards, 14 La. Ann. 374 (1859), extending the rule found in Proseus v. Mason, 12 La. 16 (1838).
215. See page 496 infra.
216. Under the proposed Code the garnishee will have a legal delay of 15 days
to answer. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE,
EXPOSt DES MOTIFS No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgments art. 40 (1954).
See page 497 infra.
217. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 262 (1870); LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, Exposit DES MOTIFS No. 15, bk. IV, Execution
of Judgments art. 39 (1954) ; John I. Adams & Co. v. Millsaps & Trousdale, Gun-
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answered is determined by the character of the demands which
plaintiff makes in the interrogatory. If plaintiff satisfies himself with general and sweeping interrogatories, they may be
properly met with answers of a similar character. 218 Where,

however, by reason of a lack of confidence in the integrity of
the garnishee, or for other reason, plaintiff propounds interrogatories calling for pertinent2 19 details of any kind, the inter-

rogatories must be answered according to their letter and
spirit. 20
Fairness requires the garnishee to make some disclosures in
his answers even though no pointed interrogatory calls for such
information. The garnishee is under a duty to disclose all facts
which bear a reasonably close relation to the success of plaintiff's efforts to seize assets of defendant in the garnishee's
hands. 221 Accordingly, the garnishee should disclose his knowledge that the defendant has been thrown into bankruptcy;222

and a bank made garnishee should disclose in its answer that it
has no account in the name of defendant, individually or in some
representative capacity. 28 Failure of the garnishee to make a
full disclosure of such facts may result in his answers being characterized as vague or evasive with the attendant consequences
224
discussed below.
.by's Dec. 33 (La. 1885) ; Meyer v. Madden, Gunby's Dec. 12 (La. 1885) (but
they need not necessarily be "yes" or "'no").
"Categorical" means direct and explicit in the manner of expression. WEBSTER,
NEw

INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY

OF

THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(UNABRIDGED)

(2d ed. 1949). While "categorical" does not require that the answer to each interrogatory be separately stated, the well-drawn answer will contain separate answers
rather than a running statement which in fact answers all the interrogatories.
Separate answers for each interrogatory lessens the chance that the answer may
be misinterpreted and the garnishee prejudiced thereby.
In Taylor & Knapp v. McGee, 19 La. Ann. 374 (1867), the court held a general statement made by the garnishee that he had no property belonging to defendant nor did he owe him anything, to be a sufficient answer, since it negated every
fact inquired of in the interrogatories.
For an illustration of when answers will and will not be considered as, having
been made categorically, see Ullmeyer v. Ehrmann & Lecanu, 24 La. Ann. 82
(1872) ; DeBlanc v. Webb, 5 La. 82 (1833).
218. Denis v. Hogan, 2 McGloin 242 (La. 1884).
219. If the interrogatory calls for information not pertinent to the presence
in the garnishee's hands of assets belonging to defendant, the garnishee need not
answer that part of the interrogatory. See page 469 supra.
220. Denis v. Hogan, 2 McGloin 242 (La. 1884).
221. Nugent v. Vairin, 9 Rob. 453 (La. 1845).
222. Ibid.
223. Wagner v. Tarrant, 124 So. 614 (La. App. 1929). But there is no duty
of disclosure when the account is in the name of "La. Auto Club, W. J. Durand
[defendant] President." Edward Thompson Co. v. Durand, 124 La. 381, 50 So.
407 (1909).
224.. In addition to disclosing those facts which he is obligated to disclose,' the
garnishee 'should also include in his answer any assertion' necessary for the pro-
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Rules of construction for answers. The garnishee's answers
must be given a fair and reasonable construction.225 When the

answer to one interrogatory is not sufficiently explicit, the deficiency may be supplied by reference to the answers given to
other interrogatories in the same connection. 226 Similarly, an
unimpeached statement must be read in the light of all its quali-

fying clauses, and one phrase cannot be singled out to serve as
an unqualified admission that the garnishee has assets belonging
to defendant. 2 7 If the garnishee fails to answer an interrogatory, it is presumed that had the answer been given, it would
have been favorable to plaintiff.228 Thus, if the garnishee fails
to answer an interrogatory asking for the amount of defendant's

assets in his hands, the presumption is raised that the garnishee
has sufficient assets to satisfy the claim which plaintiff has
against defendant. 229 Where any obscurity in the meaning of an
answer arises from the manner in which the interrogatory is
phrased, the obscurity of the answer is the fault of plaintiff, and
cannot be charged against the garnishee.2 30
Liability of the garnishee as determined by his answer. As
previously noted, the garnishee's answers are presumed to be
truthful, and are entitled to full credit until they are traversed

and disproved by plaintiff. So long as plaintiff has not traversed
and disproved the answers, they are the sole measure of the garnishee's liability. 231 If the garnishee fails in his duty to answer
tection of his own rights. See, e.g., First State Bank v. Burton, 222 La. 1030, 64
So.2d 421 (1953); Airey & Stouse v. Hoke, 164 La. 998, 115 So. 60 (1927);
McRae, Coffman & Co. v. Austen, 9 La. Ann. 360 (1854).
225. Meyer v. Madden, Gunby's Dec. 12 (La. 1885). If the time at which
the garnishee is contemplated as having defendant's assets in her possession is not
indicated in either the interrogatories or the answer, the court will construe the
answers to relate to the time at which the interrogatories were served. John Adams
& Co. v. Millsaps & Trousdale, Gunby's Dec. 33 (La. 1865).
226. Maduel and Conte v. Mousseau, 28 La. Ann. 691 (1876) ; Johnson v. Bolt,
144 So. 296 (La. App. 1932).
227. Auge v. Variol, 31 La. Ann. 865 (1879). The statement "I have, but as
a pledge" cannot be divided to make the words "I have" stand alone.
228. Gaty, McCune & Co. v. The Franklin Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 12 La. Ann.
272 (1857) ; Vason v. Clarke, 4 La. Ann. 581 (1849) (failure to answer when
note left garnishee's hands raises presumption that the note was in the garnishee's
possession at the time of seizure). See also Taylor & Knapp v. McGee, 19 La.
Ann. 374 (1867).
It would appear that if the interrogatory which the garnishee does not answer
is material, that plaintiff should be entitled to institute proceedings for judgment
pro confesso against the garnishee. Vason v. Clarke, supra.
229. Gaty, McCune & Co. v. The Franklin Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 12 La. Ann.
272 (1857).
230. John 1. Adams & Co. v. Millsaps & Trousdale, Gunby's Dec. 33 (La.
1885).
231. State v. Taylor, 172 La. 20, 133 So. 349 (1931) ; Airey & Stouse v. Hoke,
164 La. 998, 115 So. 60 (1927) ; Henry v. Bew, 43 La. Ann. 476, -9 So. 101
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the interrogatories fairly and categorically, and one or more of
288
23 2
his answers on their face are manifestly vague, or evasive,
plaintiff may treat the answers as if they had not been filed and
34
is entitled to seek judgment pro confesso against the garnishee.2
If the answers admit without reservation that the garnishee
is indebted or has assets belonging to defendant, and if plaintiff
23 5
has obtained judgment against defendant in the main demand,

plaintiff is entitled to rule the garnishee into court to show cause
why the latter should not be cast in judgment to pay the assets
for the satisfaction of plaintiff's claim. 2 6 On the other hand, so
long as the answers are not disproved, the indebtedness or assets

admitted by the garnishee to be owed or in his possession will
not benefit plaintiff if the admission is qualified by the assertion
of a defense to the garnishment proceeding, or by the assertion
of any grounds which if true would prevent plaintiff from sub2 87
jecting the assets or indebtedness to his claim.
When the answers of the garnishee deny any indebtedness or
assets belonging to defendant and are not traversed and dis(1891); Flash & Co. v. Norris, 27 La. Ann. 93 (1875); Coleman, Britton &
Withers v. Fennimore, 16 La. Ann. 253 (1861) ; Barnes, Lyman & Co. v. C. C.
Wayland & Co., 14 La. Ann. 791 (1859); Helme v. C. W. Pollard & Co., 14 La.
Ann. 306 (1859) ; McDowell v. Crookspeake, 10 La. Ann. 31 (1855) ; Blanchard
v. Vargas, 18 La. 486 (1841) ; Oliver v. Gwin, 17 La. 28 (1841) ; Oakey v. Mississippi & Alabama R.R., 13 La. 567 (1839) ; Johnson v. Bolt, 144 So. 296 (La.
App. 1932).
232. Burke, Watt & Co. v. Taylor, 15 La. 236 (1840) ; Hart & Merritt v. Dahlgreen & Co., 16 La. 559 (1840).
233. Scharff & Bernheimer v. McCullough, McLeod & Co., Gunby's Dec. 31
(La. 1885) ; Davis v. Oakford, 11 La. Ann. 379 (1856). For cases where a charge
of evasive answer was made, but not sustained, see Lewis, Nauson & Co. v. Homer,
Rex & Tracy, 23 La. Ann. 254 (1871) ; Estill v. Goodloe, 6 La. Ann. 122 (1851).
234. It is to be noted that utilizing the penalty of judgment pro confesso for
evasive or vague answers is a product of the jurisprudence and is based on no
express provisions of the Code of Practice of 1870. The provisions of the proposed
Code of Practice likewise contain no provisions for the treatment of such answers.
It is probable that the jurisprudential treatment will likewise be applied under the
proposed Code. The penalty for such answers, however, would be much less severe
under the lenient provisions for judgment pro confesso under the proposed Code.
Should the court in its wisdom believe a stronger sanction is called for in such
cases than is provided under the new judgment pro confesso provisions, a rule
might be developed that evasive or vague answers will ipso facto subject the garnishee to liability for the full amount of plaintiff's claim. Such a rule would be
substantially similar to the results reached in judgments pro conesso under the
Code of Practice of 1870. See generally pages 494 infra.
235. See page 502 infra.
236. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 246 (1870) ; LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOSP DES MOTIFs No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgments art. 43 (1953). See also Robeson v. Mississippi & Alabama
R.R., 13 La. 465 (1839).
237. See generally pages 457, 459, 483, 484 supra. Helme v. C. W. Pollard &
Co., 14 La. Ann. 306 (1859). But if the qualification does not disentitle plaintiff
to avail himself of the assets, he may subject the assets to the satisfaction of his
claim. Baker v. New Orleans, 0. & G.W. R.R., 10 La. Ann. 110 (1855)..
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proved, the garnishee cannot be held liable to plaintiff. 28 Again,
if plaintiff doubts the integrity of the garnishee and suspects
that his answers are false, it devolves upon him to traverse the
answers and to prove their falsity. Proof that the denial in the
garnishee's answers is false necessarily entails proving as a matter of fact that the garnishee is indebted to defendant, or that
2 9 If
he has assets in his possession which belong to defendant.
plaintiff successfully traverses the answers of the garnishee, the
measure of liability is the amount of assets and indebtedness
established as in fact belonging or is owed to defendant by the
garnishee. 240 Under the provisions of the Code of Practice of
1870, an anomalous situation is thus presented: the garnishee
who makes evasive or vague answers is subject to liability under
judgment pro confesso for the entire amount of plaintiff's claim,
while the liability of the garnishee who commits the greater
wrong of lying is measured only by the assets which are in fact
owed or belong to defendant. Article 264 has no counterpart in
the proposed Code of Practice. Cases of this type arising under
the proposed Code will likely be handled in the same manner as
cases involving vague or evasive answers,2 41 viz., considering
false answers as equivalent to a failure to answer, with the resulting application of the provisions for judgment pro confesso.
Under this procedure, false, vague, and evasive answers are
treated alike and the anomaly existing under the present Code of
Practice is removed. Due to the more liberal provision for judgment pro confesso under the proposed Code, the measure of the
garnishee's liability for making false answers will normally be
the same as that prescribed by Article 264 of the Code of Practice
of 1870, i.e., the amount of indebtedness
and assets which in fact
242
are owed and belong to defendant.
Filing of amended or supplemental answers. Since the garnishee is a mere stakeholder whose principal duty is to give true
238. Germania Savings Bank v. Peuser, 40 La. Ann. 796, 5 So. 75 (1888)
State National Bank v. Boatner, 39 La. Ann. 843, 2 So. 589 (1887) ; Rose V.
Whaley, 14' La. Ann.'374 (1859) ; Scharff & Bernheimer v. McCullough, Gunby's
Dec. 31 (La. 1885) ; Oliver v. Gwin, 17 La. 28 (1841) ; Victoria Lumber Co. v.
Woodson, 127 So. 95 (La. App. 1930).
239. If the interrogatories propounded require the garnishee to give his opinion
on a question of law, since opinion and not facts are elicited, if the garnishee is
mistaken in his belief as to the legal status of the property it cannot be said that
his answers are false. Brian v. Shad, 186 So. 766 (La. App. 1939).
240. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 264 (1870); Humphrey v. Midkiff, 122 La.
939, 48 So. 331 (1909) ; Marks & Co. v. Reinberg, 16 La. Ann. 348 (1861).
241. But see note 234 8upra.
242. For a discussion of judgment pro conjesso under the provisions of the pro..
posed Code of Practice, see page 497 infra.
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and responsive answers to interrogatories, the courts have not
accorded him the same liberal privileges of filing amended or

supplemental answers as is accorded defendants in ordinary
suits. 243 Under some circumstances, however, the garnishee is
permitted to alter his initial answers by amendment or supple-

mental answers. If this is permitted, the rule appears to be that
they must be filed within the same delay prescribed for the initial
244
filing of the garnishee's answers.

Where, despite the good faith of the garnishee in answering
the interrogatories, his answers are not as comprehensive as they
might have been, the garnishee may, in the discretion of the
245
court, be allowed to file amended or supplemental answers.
However, where the garnishee files initial answers which are
manifestly evasive or vague, no amendment or supplemental answers will be permitted.2 46 In this situation the plaintiff has the
right to seize upon the garnishee's misconduct and seek a judgment pro confesso. By the same token, if the garnishee answers
that he has assets belonging to defendant, he will not be allowed
to file amended or supplemental answers denying this unless he
can show that an error was made in good faith.2 4 7 Except where
243. DeBlanc v. Webb, 5 La. 82 (1833). If the clerk of court loses the answers
after they have been filed, the contents of the answers may be established by a
competent witness' testimony. Taylor v. McGee, 19 La. Ann. 374 (1867).
244. See page 487 infra. There would appear to be no reason why a different
time limit should obtain for filing amended or supplemental answers than for the
filing of initial answers. It is to be noted that the statement of the limits within
which initial answers may be filed contains reference only to the judgment pro
confesso, since that is the judgment to be rendered when the garnishee fails to
answer. These rules would apply literally in the cases where the initial answers
sought to be amended or supplemented are manifestly evasive or vague, since plaintiff would be seeking judgment pro confesso against the garnishee for his misconduct in answering in this fashion. Where the initial answers admit the existence
of assets in the garnishee's hands, or contain statements other than those which
may be considered as evasive or vague, the only judgment plaintiff would be seeking against the garnishee would be a judgment ordering him to pay the assets over
to the sheriff. In these instances the name of the judgment sought to be obtained
would be different although the measure of time would be the same.
While the case of Tapp v. Green, 22 La. Ann. 42 (1870) would appear to
adopt the same delay for cases of garnishment under writ of attachment, there
apparently has been no case directly considering the time limit for filing amended
or supplemental answers in cases of garnishment under writ of fieri facias. The
case of Hennen v. Forget, 27 La. Ann. 381 (1875), however, would be consistent
with the application of the same delay as if prescribed by the courts for the filing
of initial answers. See also Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Dresser, 145 La. 133,
81 So. 875 (1919).
245. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Dresser, 145 La. 133, 81 So. 875 (1919)
Hennen v. Forget, 27 La. Ann. 381 (1875); Tapp v. Green, 22 La. Ann. 42
(1870) ; Davis v. Oakford, 11 La. Ann. 379 (1856).
246. Tapp v. Green, 22 La. Ann. 42 (1870) ; Davis v. Oakford, 11 La. Ann.
379 (1856) ; DeBlanc v. Webb, 5 La. 82 (1833).
247. Maduel v. Mousseau, 28 La. Ann. 691 (1876) ; Tapp v. Green, 22 La. Ann.
42 (1870) ; Thomas v. Fuller, 26 La. Ann. 625 (1874). In C. H. Lawrence & Co.
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the privilege of filing amended or supplemental answers rests
in the discretion of the court, the garnishee will be permitted to
file such answers if plaintiff fails to raise an objection. 24 8
Judgment Pro Confesso
As previously noted, when the garnishee fails to answer the
interrogatories within the legal delay, plaintiff is entitled to seek
judgment pro confesso, against the garnishee. 24
Further,
evasive or vague answers filed by the garnishee even within the
legal delay are considered as being no answers at all, and plaintiff is likewise entitled to seek judgment pro confesso.5 ° Under
a literal application of the provision of the Code of Practice of
1870, if for any reason the garnishee failed to answer the interrogatories within the prescribed delay, plaintiff may immediately have him cast in judgment pro confesso and afterwards ordered to pay the total amount of plaintiff's claim against defendant, plus interest and court costs. Under the rules allowing
plaintiff almost unrestricted freedom in causing as many parties
to be made garnishees as he wishes, the judgment pro confesso
became oppressive and unduly harsh in the many cases where the
garnishee failed to answer due to simple oversight or other nonblameworthy causes. 251 This dissatisfaction with the judgment
pro confesso caused the Louisiana Law Institute to make radical
changes in both the nature and effect of the judgment in the
preparation of the proposed Code of Practice. The role of the
judgment pro confesso under the provisions of the Code of Practice of 1870, and the proposed Code, are treated separately below.
Judgment pro confesso under the Code of Practice of 1870.
Under Article 263 of the Code of Practice of 1870, the mere failure of the garnishee to file his answers within the legal delay
v. Hermance, Man. Unrep. Cas. 335 (1877-1880), the court permitted the garnishee
to obtain an injunction against the enforcement of a judgment against him when
the garnishee's answers admitted indebtedness to defendant when it was discovered
that the amount of the debt was, by mistake, overstated. Permitting a good faith

mistake to serve as the basis for an injunction against the enforcement of a judgment would indicate that under similar circumstances before judgment is obtained
the court would permit amended or supplementary answers to be filed.
248. Rochereau & Co. v. Bringier, 22 La. Ann. 129 (1870) ; Copley v. Snow,

4 La. Ann. 521 (1849).
249. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 263 (1870); LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOS4 DES MOTIFS No. 15, Book IV, Execu-

tion of Judgments, art. 41 (1955).
250. See page 488 supra.
251. Because of this the judgment pro confesso became disfavored by the courts
and various practices and rules were evolved to avoid the injustice such judgments
may cause. See page 488 supra.
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automatically entitles plaintiff to have judgment pro confesso

against the garnishee. 252 Plaintiff's right to this judgment is not
self-executing, however, and the judgment can be obtained only

by a formal motion requesting the court to render it.255 Plaintiff
is not normally required to give the garnishee notice of his intention to seek judgment pro confesso against him and may file an
254
ex parte motion that the interrogatories be taken as confessed.
Plaintiff has no absolute right to proceed ex parte to obtain the

judgment, however, and the court may in its discretion relegate
plaintiff to proceed contradictorily with the garnishee under a
rule to show cause why the answers should not be taken as confessed. 25 5 As previously noted, even though the legal delay has
expired, the garnishee is always entitled to file his answers before the motion for judgment pro confesso is filed. 25 6 In such
cases when the garnishee files his answers plaintiff's right to
judgment pro confesso is destroyed and the garnishee's liability
must be determined by the answers he has filed. 257 If no answers

are filed, however, plaintiff is entitled of right to a judgment pro
confesso declaring the garnishee's failure to answer the interrogatories as a judicial confession that he has in his possession
sufficient assets belonging to defendant to satisfy plaintiff's
claim. 258 This judgment is interlocutory in nature 25 9 and serves

to fix, at least for the time being, the measure of the garnishee's
liability; but it does not require the garnishee to pay the amount
252. No.evidence is necessary to authorize the taking of the interrogatories as
a confession of indebtedness other than evidence of the failure of the garnishee to
answer. McKinbrough v. Castle, 19 La. Ann. 128 (1867).
The clerk of court may render a judgment pro confesso: Winnfield Furniture
Co. v. Peyton, 171 La. 519, 131 So. 657 (1930).
When judgment pro confesso is rendered it becomes effective from the date of
service of the interrogatories. Morris Lake & Son v. Strickland, 55 So.2d 51
(La. App. 1951).
253. Copley v. Dosson, 3 La. Ann. 651 (1848) Victoria Lumber Co. v. Woodson, 127 So. 95 (La. App. 1930).
254. Landry v. Dickson, 7 La. Ann. 238 (1852) Sturges v. Kendall, 2 La. Ann.
565 (1847) ; Poole v. Brooks, 12 Rob. 484 (La. 1846) ; Parmely v. Bradbury, 13
La. 351 (1839).
255. Hennen v. Forget, 27 La. Ann. 381 (1875). In this regard see Hibernia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Dresser, 145 La. 133, 81 So. 875 (1919).
256. See page 488 supra.
257. See page 488 supra.
258. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 263 (1870). If plaintiff's petition or interrogatories fail to disclose the amount of plaintiff's claim against defendant, no judgment pro confosso can be rendered. Copley v. Snow, 4 La. Ann. 521 (1849). If
the judgment actually obtained against defendant is larger than that stated in the
petition or interrogatories as being claimed against defendant, the judgment pro
confesso will be limited to the amount stated in the petition or interrogatories.
Sturges v. Kendall, 2 La. Ann. 565 (1847). See note 97 supra.
259. Elder v. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 606 (1856). But of. Poole v. Brooks, 12
Rob. 484 (La. 1846).
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of plaintiff's claim.2 6 In this respect the judgment pro confesso
serves much the same function as do the answers of the garnishee in cases where they have been seasonably filed. Though
his liability is fixed, the garnishee does not pay the amount of
plaintiff's claim until a final judgment is rendered by the court
ordering him to do so. If the garnishment proceeding is based
on a writ of fieri facias, immediately after judgment pro confesso
has been rendered plaintiff is entitled to a judgment ordering the
261
garnishee to discharge his liability by paying plaintiff's claim.
In cases of garnishment under attachment, however, though
plaintiff has judgment pro confesso against the garnishee, plaintiff cannot obtain a judgment ordering the garnishee to pay
unless and until he has perfected his right to receive payment by
2 62
obtaining a judgment against defendant in the main demand.
The nature and effect of the judgment ordering the garnishee to
263
discharge his liability will be subsequently treated.
Even though plaintiff has obtained a judgment pro confesso,
since this judgment is interlocutory in nature, the court may, before a definitive judgment is rendered ordering the garnishee to
pay the claim, set aside the judgment pro confesso and permit the
garnishee to file his answers. 264 In such cases the liability of the
garnishee fixed by the judgment pro confesso is destroyed, and
the answers filed by the garnishee determine the measure of
liability, if any. As previously seen, in cases of garnishment
under attachment, until such time as plaintiff obtains judgment
against defendant in the main demand, the garnishee is entitled
of right to answer, and the court will set aside the judgment pro
confesso to permit the garnishee to file his answer. 265 In cases
of garnishments under writ of fieri facias, and in cases of garnishments under writ of attachment when plaintiff has judgment against defendant in the main demand, the court may in the
exercise of its discretion set a judgment pro confesso aside and
260. See Rose v. Whaley, 14 La. Ann. 374 (1859). If several garnishees cited
fail to answer, all may be cast in judgment pro confesso and in this case their
liability is several. Bird v. Cain, 6 La. Ann. 248 (1851).
261. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 263 (1870). As a practical matter, under
these circumstances plaintiff usually incorporates into a single motion the request
both for judgment pro confesso and for judgment ordering the garnishee to pay
the 262.
claim.
Rose v. Whaley, 14 La. Ann. 374 (1859) ; Proseus v. Mason, 12 La.
16
(1838). The right of plaintiff to get judgment pro confesso against the garnishee
is not waived when plaintiff waits to do so until after he has gotten judgment
against defendant. Sturges v. Kendall, 2 La. Ann. 565 (1847).
263. See page 502 infra.
264. Elder v. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 606 (1856).
265. See page 488 supra.
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permit plaintiff to answer.2 60 The liberality with which the garnishee will be treated will, of course, vary from court to court.
So strong is the disfavor for the judgment pro confesso that some
courts are willing to set aside the judgment and permit the garnishee to answer in any case where he has not demonstrated in-

difference in failing to answer. 26 7 Other courts have taken a less
liberal attitude, and when the garnishee's failure is due to care2 6
lessness they will refuse to set the judgment aside.
When judgment pro confesso has been rendered because the
garnishee filed manifestly evasive or vague answers, different
considerations are involved. Although there appears to be no case

in point, the rule undoubtedly is that since the garnishee has become a wrongdoer he is not entitled to the protection of the court

against the consequences of his own misconduct, and hence the
court will not set aside a judgment pro confesso to permit him to
file amended or supplementary answers.
Judgment pro confesso under the proposed Code. Under the
proposed Code the garnishee has fifteen days after service of the
interrogatories to answer. 26 9 Even though this delay has expired,
he may file his answers anytime before a motion for judgment
pro confesso is filed. 270 Failure of the garnishee to answer within the delay or before motion is made for judgment does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a judgment pro confesso as is
266. Elder v. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 606 (1856) announces the broad rule that
before final judgment is rendered ordering the garnishee to pay plaintiff's claim,
the court may in its discretion set a judgment pro conaesso aside and permit plaintiff to answer. As previously noted, however, the case of Rose v. Whaley, 14 La.
Ann. 374 (1859) apparently would entitle the garnishment under a writ of attachment the right to file his answer any time before judgment is rendered against
defendant on the main demand. This situation, therefore, would be an exception to
the rule in Elder v. Rogers, so far as the discretion of the court is concerned.
267. Elder v. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 606 (1856) (garnishee filed affidavit of
surprise which explained the circumstances which led to their apparent neglect).
In Marchand v. Noyes, 33 La. Ann. 882 (1881), not only had the answer been
taken as confessed, but a definitive judgment had been rendered against the garnishee, the City of New Orleans, although that judgment had not become effective
because it had not been signed by the judge. The court said since the mayor was
"overwhelmed with a multiplicity of public duties," and since the city should not
suffer for his neglect, the court would set aside the judgment.
268. Warren v. Copp, 48 La. Ann. 810, 19 So. 746 (1896) (garnishee's messenger failed to file answer) ; Landry v. Dickson, 7 La. Ann. 238 (1852) (garnishee relied on assurance by sheriff that since he had no assets belonging to
defendant he need not answer the interrogatories) ; Bird v. Cain, 6 La. Ann. 248
(1851) (garnishee did not attempt to explain reason for his failure to answer, but
attacked the validity of the judgment on the grounds that the petition did not
clearly state the amount which plaintiff claimed against defendant and from the
garnishee).
269. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, Exposb
DES MoTIFs No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgments art. 40 (1954).
270. Id. art 41.
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the case under the present Code of Practice. 271 Article 41 of the
title Execution of Judgments under the proposed Code eliminates
the ex parte judgment pro confesso and provides for contra272
dictory proceedings.
Failure of the garnishee to answer will be considered prima
facie proof on trial of the motion that he has property of or is
indebted to the defendant to the extent of the unpaid judgment,
plus interest and costs.

73

The burden is on the garnishee to

prove that he has no assets of the defendant.2 74 If the garnishee
proves an amount of property or indebtedness smaller than the
amount of the plaintiff's unpaid judgment, his liability will be
limited to the amount proved. 275 However, even if the garnishee
proves that he has no assets of the defendant, he will be liable
for costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred for the motion. 276

The judgment pro confesso under the proposed Code, as under
the present Code of Practice, is interlocutory in nature and
serves to fix the measure of the garnishee's liability; but it does
not require the garnishee to pay the amount of plaintiff's claim
until final judgment is rendered by the court ordering him to do
so. Although it has often been the practice under the present
Code of Practice to set aside the judgment pro confesso before a
definitive judgment rendered ordering the garnishee to pay,
and to allow the garnishee to file his answers, 277 this would be
unnecessary under the proposed Code. The trial of the motion
for judgment pro confesso should afford the garnishee ample opportunity to establish whether or not he has assets or is indebted
to the defendant. Furthermore, in cases of garnishment under
writ of attachment the garnishee will no longer be entitled of
right to file his answers any time before judgment is rendered
278
against the defendant in the main demand.

Neither the present Code of Practice nor the proposed Code
contains an express provision for a judgment pro confesso when
the garnishee has filed manifestly evasive or vague answers. The
theory upon which a judgment pro confesso is rendered against
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Ibid. See note 252 aupra.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See note 264 supra.

LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE,
DES MOTIFS No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgmont8 art. 41 (1954).,
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the garnishee in such a situation is that since the garnishee
failed in his duty to answer fairly and categorically, plaintiff
may treat the answer as if it had not been filed. 279 It would appear that this practice will obtain under the proposed Code, but
the liability of the garnishee will be limited to the assets which

in fact he holds of the defendant, plus costs, and reasonable at20
torney fees.
Should the courts feel stronger sanctions are called for in
such cases, a rule might be developed that evasive or vague answers will ipso facto subject the garnishee to liability for the full
28
amount of plaintiff's unpaid judgment. 1
Traverse of Garnishee's Answers
If the answers of the garnishee admit only a conditional
or
qualified liability to the defendant, or if the answers unqualifiedly deny liability, the plaintiff may doubt their verity and take
a rule to traverse. 28 2 A rule to traverse must be filed within
twenty days after the plaintiff has notice that the answers have

been filed.28 3 The record must show that the notice of filing of

279. See note 234 supra.
280. See note 278 supra.
281. See page 497 8upra.
282. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art 264 (1870); LA. R.S. 13:3911 (1950). A
judgment cannot be rendered against a garnishee who denies an indebtedness to
the defendant in answer to interrogatories, unless the answer has been properly
traversed. David v. Rode, 35 La. Ann. 961 (1883). It is not necessary that the
defendant be made a party to the rule to traverse, or that he have notice of the
intention of the plaintiff to take the rule. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Myrtle
Grove Syrup Co., 175 La. 969, 144 So. 730 (1932). The traverse proceedings
assume the nature and formalities of a suit between only the plaintiff and the
garnishee. It is no longer a case in which the garnishee merely complies with the
process of court, occupying more the character of a witness than a party. Carroll
v. Powell, 136 So. 219 (La. App. 1931) ; National Park Bank v. Concordia Land
and Timber Co., 159 La. 86, 105 So. 234 (1925). However, the issue thus formed
does not require an answer in writing by the garnishee. Oakley v. Miss. & Ala.
R.R., 13 La. 567 (1839).
Even before plaintiff takes a rule to traverse the answers of the garnishee, it
has been held that he can get a court order to inspect the notes and bills of the
garnishee which the garnishee in his answer stated were pledged to him. Sewall
v. McNeill, 17 La. 185 (1841).
283. LA. R.S. 13:3911 (1950). It has been held that this provision prohibits
an amendment to the rule to traverse after the expiration of the delay. Wuerpel v.
Sinnott, 147 La. 1099, 86 So. 558 (1920). See Securities Finance Co. v. Phipp,
157 So. 747 (La. App. 1934).
If the rule to traverse is not timely filed, the answers remain the sole measure
of the garnishee's liability. Airey & Stouse v. Hoke, 164 La. 998, 115 So. 60
(1927). If the garnishee has denied any liability to the defendant, the property,
rights, and credits of the garnishee in his hands are automatically released. Johnson v. Bolt, 146 So. 375 (La. App. 1933).
When the circumstances are such that plaintiff does not discover the untruthfulness of the garnishee's answers until after the expiration of the delay for
traversing, he will have to have issued a new garnishment, and traverse the answers under it.
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the answers has been served upon the plaintiff, or the statutory

delay for traversing will not commence to run.284 Since there is
no good reason for the delay for traversing to be longer than the
delays in ordinary suits, the proposed Code shortens this period
to fifteen days after the plaintiff has notice that the answers
285
have been filed.

When the plaintiff timely files his rule to traverse, he must
serve notice of this proceeding upon the garnishee. 28 6 This is
provided for in neither the present Code of Practice nor the proposed Code, but is essential under the theory that there must be
issue joined and an opportunity afforded for defense before a
judgment can be rendered. 28 7 The garnishee will usually be cited
to appear in court to defend his answers within three to five
days.
Trial of the traverse. Since the answers of the garnishee to
the interrogatories are presumed to be truthful, the burden is on
the plaintiff to prove them false. 28 8 In some instances, i.e., when
the garnishee has admitted a conditional or possible liability to
the defendant, the plaintiff does not have to establish the falsity
of the answers to prove the garnishee's liability to the defendant.2 9 If this is the case, the plaintiff may use any competent
284. Alexius Bros. & Co. v. Brock, 58 So.2d 279 (La. App. 1952). In Armstrong v. Ellerslie, 146 La. 559, 83 So. 830 (1920), the plaintiff timely filed his
motion for rule to traverse the answers of the garnishee, but the clerk of court
failed to endorse the filing mark. The Supreme Court held that the motion would
be treated as having been filed timely since the plaintiff had reasonably complied
with the law.
In Industrial Loan & Ins. Co. v. Price, 31 So.2d 881 (La. App. 1947), there
had been no formal service of notice that the answers of the garnishee had been
filed. However, plaintiff filed a formal motion to set aside the answers, and the
court held that, by filing the motion, the garnishee waived his right to object to
the absence of notice, and the delay of 20 days commenced to run from the filing
of the motion by the plaintiff.
285. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOSt
DES MOTIFs No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgments art. 42 (1954).

286. Rockwell v. Smith, 1 La. 228 (1830) ; Allyn v. Wright, 9 Mart. (O.S.)
271 (La. 1821).
287. See note 286 supra.
288. Home Finance Service v. Treadway, 185 So. 700 (La. App. 1939) ; Flash
& Co. v. Norris, 27 La. Ann. 93 (1875). Apparently, the only deviation from this
rule occurs when the garnishee claims that he holds property under a pledge from
defendant. In this situation the garnishee must prove that he holds a valid pledge
of the property. Commercial Bank of Alexandria v. Shanks, 129 La. 861, 56 So.
1028 (1912).
289. Wagner v. Tarrant, 124 So. 614 (La. App. 1929) ; Appalachian Corp. v.
Compania General De Petroleo, 162 La. 774, 111 So. 160 (1927). It is only where
a question of fact is presented that the plaintiff is limited to written proof or the
oath of two credible witnesses. In Home Finance Service v. Treadway, 185 So.
700 (La. App. 1939), it was held that if the garnishee answers that he did not
know, as a matter of fact, whether he owed defendant any amount, proof on
traverse would not be limited to the forms provided for in Article 264 of the
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proof that tends to show the garnishee's indebtedness to, or possession of property of, the defendant. 20 0 However, if the plaintiff
is required to prove the falsity of the garnishee's answers to
establish his liability, he must offer either written proof or the
oath of two witnesses worthy of belief. 291 This limitation has
been necessarily harsh and has proven almost unworkable. For
example, in one case the plaintiff was not allowed to traverse
the answers of the garnishee who had orally admitted indebtedness to the defendant, but the plaintiff had no written proof, nor
could he produce two credible witnesses. 292 Realizing the unworkability of this limitation, the redactors of the proposed Code
have omitted this provision. Under their proposal, the answers
of the garnishee may be traversed by any competent proof which
the court considers of sufficient weight to prevail over the gar293
nishee's answers.
If on trial of the rule to traverse, the plaintiff's aims are
vague as to what property he is trying to prove in the hands of
the garnishee, the latter may properly file an exception. 294 Also,
if the plaintiff attempts to raise issues not appropriate to garnishment proceedings, such as attacking the garnishee's claim of
title to assets or if he seeks to establish his liability arising out
of an alleged breach of contract with the defendant, the garnishee can file an exception to such an action being tried in
summary proceedings. 295 However, if the objection is not raised
before trial on the traverse, it will be held to have been waived. 296
Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870. The court also stated that there did not have
to be a traverse under such circumstances, although it was the more desirable
procedure.
290. Ibid.
291. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 264 (1870). The credibility of the garnishee
cannot be attacked on traverse as a means of contradicting the answers of the
garnishee. Barnes, Lyman & Co. v. C. C. Wayland & Co., 14 La. Ann. 791 (1859).
See also note 289 supra.
292. Taylor v. Strenzke, 123 So. 416 (La. App. 1929).
293. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, EXPOSIk
DES MOTrFS No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgments art. 42 (1954).
294. Florance v. Yorke, 2 La. Ann. 995 (1847). In this case it was held that
a mere motion would not be sufficient and a written exception of vagueness must
be formally placed on record. Accord, Carter Bros. & Co. v. Galloway & Burns,
36 La. Ann. 730 (1884).
295. Carter Bros. & Co. v. Galloway & Burns, 36 La. Ann. 730 (1884). A
written exception to trying title in garnishment proceedings must be made before
argument on the merits. See pages 480, 481, 482 supra for comprehensive treatment of this area.
Although plaintiff cannot attack the garnishee's title to property on traverse,
he can traverse the answers of the garnishee who claims that the property in his
possession is pledged to him. The doctrine that garnishment proceedings cannot
be substituted for the revocatory action is applicable only to cases where the
title of the defendant has been apparently divested by a contract in due form.
296. Rice Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Saunders, 130 La. 627, 58 So. 413 (1912).
See also note 181 supra.
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When the nature of the dispute as to liability between the garnishee and the defendant is one that can fairly be determined
by trial on the traverse, the court, in the interest of expediency,
297
has allowed plaintiff to try the issue in traverse proceeding.
However, it is doubtful whether this procedure will be extended
beyond a case where the liability of the garnishee to the defendant depends upon the determination of a single question of fact.
When the garnishee does not claim title to assets sought to
be garnished, but answers that the property belongs to a third
party, the plaintiff can traverse the answers. However, he may
28
do so only if he makes all interested persons parties to the suit.
Both the Code of Practice of 1870 and the proposed Code fix
the liability of the garnishee whose answers have been successfully traversed as the amount of property held or indebtedness in
fact owed to the defendant. 299 Even if the plaintiff is successful on his rule to traverse, he must further prove that the garnishee held assets of the defendant.80 0 If the assets proved to be
held by the garnishee are not sufficient to satisfy the unpaid
judgment of the plaintiff, he must look elsewhere to satisfy his
claim.
Judgment Against the Garnishee and Order to Deliver Possession
of Property or Pay Debts
Where garnishment proceedings have been issued under a
writ of attachment and the garnishee admits in his answer, or it
is established on the motion to traverse that he has property belonging to the defendant or is indebted to him, the plaintiff cannot obtain judgment against the garnishee until he obtains a
judgment in the main demand.8 0 ' In practice the plaintiff usual297. Lowery v. Zorn, 184 La. 1054, 168 So. 297 (1936) ; Liminet v. Fourchy,
51 La. Ann. 1299, 26 So. 87 (1899). For comprehensive discussion of these cases
see note 176 supra.

298. Airey & Stouse v. Hoke, 164 La. 998, 115 So. 60 (1927). In this case
the statement was made that "where the evidence upon the disclosure of a garnishee
shows that the debt sought to be garnished was payable to a third person, and not

the defendant in the principal action, the disclosure itself is sufficient to protect
the garnishee, and it devolves upon the plaintiff to bring in such party, if he
desires to to test the validity of the claim." See First State Bank v. Burton, 222

La. 1030, 64 So.2d 421 (1953).
. 299. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 264 (1870); LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, Exposit DES MOTIFS No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgments art. 43 (1954).
. 300. John Marks & Co. v. Reinberg, 16 La. Ann. 348 (1861) ; Pooley, Nichol
& Co. v. Snow, 12 La. Ann. 814 (1857).

301. Consolidated Cos. v. Rayne, 167 La. 593, 120 So. 18 (1929) ; Lehman,
Stern & Co. v. E. Martin & Co., 132 La. 231, 61 So. 212 (1913) ; Collins & Leake
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ly incorporates a prayer for judgment against the garnishee in
his principal demand against the defendant. 0 2 However, this is
not essential for a judgment against the garnishee, and sometimes a judgment is subsequently rendered against the garnishee
08
on a rule to show cause.

Where garnishment proceedings have been issued under a
writ of fieri facias, and the liability of the garnishee established,
the plaintiff may immediately rule the garnishee into court to

to pay the
show cause why he should not be cast in judgment
04
judgment.
plaintiff's
of
satisfaction
in
assets
Unless a judgment pro confesso has been rendered against the
garnishee, he will be ordered to deliver the property or pay the
indebtedness that existed at the time the interrogatories were

served. 03 No judgment can be taken against the garnishee for
more than that which is sufficient to cover plaintiff's claim
against the defendant and costs.30 6 If the plaintiff has obtained
satisfaction in part by other means, the judgment against the
07
garnishee will be only for the unsatisfied remainder.

If the debt which the garnishee owes the defendant is not yet
due, he will be ordered to pay the debt to the plaintiff when it
v. Friend, 21 La. Ann. 7 (1869) ; Caldwell v. Townsend, 5 Mart. (N.S.)307 (1827).
See Lynch v. Burr, 10 Rob. 136 (La. 1845). See also Frank 1. Abbott Lumber
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 140 La. 130, 72 So. 841 (1916) (plaintiff cannot get the
court to order the garnishee to deposit the money with the civil sheriff or in the
registry of the court) ;Lehman, Stern, & Co. v. B. Martin & Co., supra (there
will never be judgment against a garnishee who has surrendered the property to
the court).
302. See Kirkman v. Hills, 16 La. 523 (1840).
303. Ibid. See also Bullis v. Town of Jackson, 203 La. 289, 14 So.2d 1 (1943)
Sturges v. Kendall, 2 La. Ann. 565 (1847).
Payment to the sheriff before a court order to do so will not relieve the garnishee of liability. Yale & Co. v. Whitmore, 15 La. Ann. 63 (1860).
304. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 246 (1870). This rule remains the same in the
proposed Code of Practice. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE
OF PRACTICE, ExPOSP, DES MOTIFS No. 15, Book IV, Execution of Judgments art.
43 (1954).
305. See note 304 supra. In Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. Payne & Gilman,
21 La. Ann. 380 (1869), the garnishee paid certain funds, which belonged to the
defendant, to third persons after service of the interrogatories. The court held
that he was liable for the funds he held as of the time of service of the interrogatories. However, if the property held by the garnishee becomes worthless after
service of the interrogatories, he is not liable for the loss. Hearne v. Commercial
Nat. Bank, 155 La. 488, 99 So. 413 (1924). See also A. & J. Dennistoun & Co.
v. New York Croton & Steam F. Co., 6 La. Ann. 782 (1851).
The garnishees are liable only for the sum which they owe the defendants, and
do not have to pay interest until they are put in default, since the garnishment
process prohibited them from paying until ordered by the court. Clark Bros. &
Co. v. Powell & Co., 17 La. Ann. 177 (1865).
306. See note 305 supra.
307. See note 305 supra.
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becomes due.808 If the debt owed the garnishee has been previously seized by process issuing from judicial proceedings currently being conducted in another state, the judgment ordering
garnishee to pay the indebtedness or deliver property will be conditional on the plaintiff giving adequate security to protect the
garnishee should the out-of-state court order him to pay the
debt.80 9 Also, it has been indicated that another procedure may
be favored - a judgment will be rendered against the garnishee,
but a stay of execution ordered until the out-of-state proceeding
is determined.3 10
The above principles also apply when a judgment pro confesso
has been rendered against the garnishee, the only difference
being that under the present Code of Practice the plaintiff will
rule the garnishee into court to show cause why he should not
satisfy the unpaid judgment. 311 A copy of the order of court,
with the receipt of the sheriff, is delivered to the garnishee and
is equivalent to a receipt from the defendant himself.
A garnishee who has mistakenly answered that he is indebted
to the defendant has been allowed to correct this error on the rule
to show cause. 12 Also, if the proceedings by which the judgment
has been obtained against the defendant are irregular, in the
sense that the garnishee will not be protected if he pays the indebtedness, this could be brought out on the rule to show cause. 818
Once a valid judgment ordering payment of indebtedness or delivery of property is rendered against the garnishee, in order to
escape liability he will have to show circumstances warranting a
3 14
new trial, rehearing, or action of nullity.
308. See page 460 8upra.
309. See page 485 supra.
310. Isaac v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 204 La. 1, 14
So.2d 865 (1943). See page 485 supra.

311. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 263 (1870). If the judgment actually obtained against the defendant is larger than that stated in the petition or interrogatories as being claimed against the defendant, the judgment pro coanfesso will be

limited to the amount stated in the petition or interrogatories. Sturges v. Kendall,
2 La. Ann. 565 (1847).

312. Robeson v. Mississippi & Ala. R.R., 13 La. 465 (1839).
313. Roboteau v. Valeton, 11 Rob. 218 (La. 1845) ; Allard v. De Brot, 15 La.
253 (1840).
314. See Rockholt Lbr. Co. v. Miller, 64 So.2d 477 (La. App. 1953), where it
was held that LA. R.S. 13:3923 (1950), which authorized a reopening of a ease
against the garnishee, only applied to garnishment of wages and salaries.
In Marchand v. Noyes, 33 La. Ann. 882 (1881), a judgment pro coate6880 was
rendered against the City of New Orleans when the mayor negligently failed to file

answers to the interrogatories.
city to pay over the assets.

Plaintiff then obtained a judgment against the

Upon application of the garnishee, the trial judge set

aside the judgment and granted a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the
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Rights of Defendant
When assets of the defendant have been seized by garnishment process under either a writ of fieri facias or attachment,
he may post bond and obtain their release from seizure immediately after the interrogatories have been served on the garnishee.315 Where defendant is unable to post bond to free the
property seized in the hands of the garnishee, it has been held
that he may take a rule on plaintiff and garnishee contradictorily
to show cause why the assets should not be turned over to the
16
sheriff to be held pending the litigation.3
Although the primary question in garnishment proceedings
is usually whether ultimately there shall be judgment against the
garnishee, the defendant is not wholly cut off from interfering
to prevent judgment. If the plaintiff's claim against the garnishee is invalid, 317 or if the defendant has a defense which defeats the claim upon which the garnishment process is issued,31 8
he could clearly intervene to prevent judgment against the garnishee. Also, if the property in the hands of the garnishee is by
law exempt from seizure,3 19 or if more property has been seized
than is necessary to satisfy plaintiff's claim,3 20 the defendant
would have the right to raise this in garnishment proceedings.
Since the purpose of garnishment proceedings is to establish
assets in the hands of the garnishee which belong to the defendant, it has been held that he cannot oppose an exception of no
cause of action at any stage of the proceedings. 8 2' However,
when the purpose of an intervention by the defendant is to
establish a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff, he has been
allowed to do so. In one case the garnishee denied possession of
discretion of the trial judge had been soundly exercised, for a municipal corporation should not be made to suffer for the neglect of one of its officers.
315. Release of goods seized under attachment: LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 259
(1870) ; LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED CODE OF PRACTICE, ExPosit
DES MOTIFS No. 18, Book VII, Special Proceedings, tit. 1, Provisional Remedies
art. 7 (1954). Release of goods seized under fieri facias: LA. R.S. 13:3411 (1950).
Since the garnishee is the legal custodian of the property and credits seized,
in some instances defendant may find no practical advantage in obtaining the
release of the assets. For comprehensive discussion see page 471 supra.
316. Rochereau & Co. v. Guidry, 24 La. Ann. 294 (1872). See note 161 supra.
317. See Brode v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 8 Rob. 244 (La. 1844).
318. Frasier & Adams v. Banks, 11 La. Ann. 31 (1856).
319. Whitney Central Trust & Savings Bank v. Norton, 157 La. 199, 102
So. 306 (1924) ; Goodwin v. Southern Kraft Corp., 6 So.2d 783 (La. App. 1942)
(wages exempt from seizure).
320. See page ... supra.
321. Carroll v. Powell, 136 So. 219 (La. App. 1931).
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any assets of the defendant, and the latter was allowed to inter8 22
vene and traverse the answers of the garnishee.

It has been held that the defendant, as a third party, has sufficient interest to appeal from the final judgment in garnishment proceedings. 828 Also, a judgment by the plaintiff in garnishment proceedings is res judicata as to defendant only to the
amount of indebtedness or assets that the garnishee was required
to pay in the garnishment proceedings.8 2 4

He can subsequently

sue the garnishee and establish liability for any assets or indebtedness that the garnishee was not ordered to deliver or pay in
8 25
the garnishment proceedings.
GARNISHMENT

OF WAGES AND SALARIES

For the most part, garnishment of wages and salaries is governed by the same substantive and procedural rules appropriate
for garnishment of other assets. However, there are a few substantive and procedural rules peculiar to this type of garnishment which deserve specific mention. -Eighty per cent of defendant's earnings are exempt from seizure, provided that in no
case can his monthly salary be reduced below $60.826 It is to be
noted that if the defendant earns over $60 per month, the seizable
portion is not 20% of the amount over $60, but is 20% of the
entire salary earned, provided that this sum does not reduce the
portion available to the defendant to less than $60.827

The most significant difference between garnishment of
wages and salaries and seizure of other assets is the "continuing
nature" of the seizure under a garnishment of wages and sal-

aries.8 28 That is, the defendant does not have to be entitled in all

respects to the ownership of the wages for an effective seizure.
Under one set of interrogatories, not only the accrued earnings

829
are seized, but also future earnings.

The interrogatories inquire as to whether the defendant is an
employee of the garnishee, the rate and manner compensation is
322. Rochereau & Co. v. Bringier, 22 La. Ann. 129 (1870).
323. First National Bank v. Lagrone, 164 La. 907, 114 So. 832 (1927).
324. Robeson v. Carpenter, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 30 (La. 1828).
325. Ibid.
326. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 644.2 (1870). If defendants' earnings are derived from the Federal Government, or are both earned and payable outside of
the state, they cannot be seized under garnishment process. For a comprehenive
discussion of exemptions from seizure see pages 457-460 supra.
327. Civic Agency v. Quealy, 172 So. 555, 556 (La. App. 1937).
328. LA. R.S. 13:3921-3927 (1950).
329. Id. 13:3923.
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paid, whether the defendant is indebted to the employer, and
whether there are other garnishments affecting the non-exempt
portion of the defendant's wages.8 8
After the garnishee answers, the court fixes the exempt portion and renders a judgment for periodic payments to the plaintiff out of the available non-exempt portion.88 1 If it is determined that a prior garnishment affects the non-exempt portion
to take effect upon
of defendant's wages, a judgment is8 rendered
2
the liquidation of the prior demand.

If the garnishee answers and establishes that the defendant
is indebted to him, the court renders an order for the liquidation
of this debt just as if it were a prior garnishment; and the plaintiff's judgment is ordered to take effect upon the termination of
this claim. 83
To include a situation where there is an increase or decrease
in defendant's compensation which might affect the amount of
compensation subject to seizure, provision is made for reopening
the case upon the motion of any party concerned. The judge may
amend or set aside his judgment and institute a new one appropriate to the changed circumstances. 8 4 Furthermore, specific
provision is made for reopening the case when a judgment pro
confesso has been rendered against the garnishee. 885
APPEAL
The final judgment in garnishment proceedings is the order
that the garnishee pay the indebtedness or deliver the prop330. Id. 13:3924, 13:3925. The monthly salary credited to defendant on the
books is not controlling if it can be shown that the defendant is actually receiving,
or entitled to receive, more. Jones v. Commagere, 189 So. 603 (La. App. 1939)
Brown Shoe Co. v. Monsour, 164 So. 340 (La. App. 1935).
If the employee works on a commission basis, the employer can be garnished
even though the defendant takes his commission out of sales and the money never
actually comes into the hands of the employer. Legal Rate Loan Co. v. Bouanchaud, 148 So. 101 (La. App. 1933).
331. LA. R.S. 13:2921 (1950). The court renders judgment for monthly, semimonthly, weekly, or daily payments to be made to the plaintiff according to the
circumstances. See Jones v. Commagere, 181 So. 198 (La. App. 1938).
332. LA. R.S. 13:3922 (1950).
333. Id. 13:3925. The employer must make a full and complete disclosure of
the status of the account, showing the time the debt was incurred, the exact amount
of the indebtedness, the credits applicable, and the manner in which the debt is
being liquidated.
334. LA. R.S. 13:3923 (1950).
335. Ibid. This provision for reopening the case after a judgment pro con esao
cannot be used to reopen a case where there has been a judgment pursuant to
garnishment of assets other than wages and salaries. Rockholt Lbr. Co. v. Miller,
64 So.2d 477 (La. App. 1953).
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erty.3 30 Therefore, there can be no appeal from a judgment pro
confesso3 7 establishing liability of the garnishee before there is
a judgment against the defendant and an order to deliver the
property or pay the indebtedness, because such proceedings are
338
interlocutory in nature and do not cause irreparable harm.
If there is a judgment against the garnishee ordering payment of the indebtedness or delivery of property, but there has
been a devolutive appeal by the defendant from the principal
judgment, the garnishee should not be required to pay; for, if the
principal judgment is reversed on appeal, the garnishee will con33 9
tinue to be liable to the defendant.
Generally it may be stated that the demand of the plaintiff
against the defendant, and not the value of the property seized
in the hands of the garnishee, is that which determines the jurisdictional amount for appeal. 340 However, if the garnishee contests the plaintiff's right to seize in his hands the amount alleged

to be due by him to the defendant, there is indication that the
amount in contest will be the jurisdictional amount for appeal,
and not the amount that the garnishee claims against the de34 1
fendant.
336. Wald & Co. v. Reedy & Co., 2 McGloin 137 (La. 1884); State em' rel.
Scooler v. Cooley, 23 La. Ann. 213 (1871); Hanna v. His Creditors, 12 Mart.
(O.S.) 32 (La. 1822).
337. The confession of judgment in garnishment proceedings is different from
the confession of judgment from which no appeal lies. The admission of having
assets of the defendant does not in this instance necessarily admit the right of the
creditor to them. State ex rel. Tureaud v. Parish Judge of Ascension, 23 La. Ann.
717 (1871) ; H. L. Bain & Co. v. Oliphant, 124 La. 583, 50 So. 588 (1909).
Therefore, once a judgment is rendered against the garnishee ordering him to
deliver the property or pay assets, there can be an appeal even though a judgment pro confesso has been rendered against them.
338. See note 337 supra. However, when a judgment has been rendered against
the garnishee in traverse proceedings, there is indication that an appeal may be
allowed. See Daigle v. Bird, 22 La. Ann. 138 (1870).
In Industrial Loan & Investment Co. v. Price, 26 So.2d 229 (La. App. 1946),
it was held that there could be no appeal for a dismissal of a rule to show cause
why the garnishee's answers should not be set aside, because the judgment was
not definitive in character, but interlocutory. The court stated that plaintiff
should have traversed the garnishee's answers after his rule was dismissed.
339. Wilkinson v. Boughton, Man. Unrep. Cas. 243 (La. 1877-1880). See also,
Bullis v. Town of Jackson, 203 La. 289, 14 So.2d 1 (1943) (garnishment proceedings under lieri facias are not brought before the Supreme Court through an
appeal taken from the judgment in the main suit.)
340. Louisiana Western Lbr. Co. v. Stanford, 178 La. 1052, 152 So. 755
(1934) ; Morgan Plan Co. v. Ares, 8 La. App. 18 (1928) ; Leverich v. Dulin, 23
La. Ann. 505 (1871) ; Gustine v. New Orleans Oil Mfg. Co., 13 La. Ann. 510
(1858).
341. Louisiana Western Lbr. Co. v. Stanford, 178 La. 1052, 152 So. 755
(1934) (dictum).
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When there is an appeal from a judgment in garnishment
proceedings, the garnishee is always a necessary party to the

appeal. 842 Although the defendant is not a necessary party,348 he
has sufficient interest as a third person to appeal from a judgment in the garnishment proceedings.844 When the defendant or
an intervening third party appeals from a judgment in garnish-

ment proceedings,3 45 both the garnishee and the plaintiff are
8 46
necessary parties.
Since the garnishee is merely a stakeholder in the garnishment proceedings, he cannot appeal to investigate the merits of
the judgment between the plaintiff and the defendant. 47 All the
garnishee has a right to complain of on appeal is the judgment

of the court insofar as it affects his interests.

48

Jesse D. McDonald*
Burrell J. Carter

Expropriation-A Survey of Louisiana Law
Eminent domain is the inherent right' of a sovereign to acquire private property for a public purpose without the owner's
342. Katz & Barnett v. Sorsby, 34 La. Ann. 588 (1882) ; Reese & Ellis v. B.
Couvers & Co., 16 La. Ann. 39 (1861) ; Copley v. Snow, 3 La. Ann. 623 (1848).
343. Katz & Barnett v. Sorsby, 34 La. Ann. 588 (1882) ; Elder v. Rogers, 11
La. Ann. 606 (1856). If the defendant is cited to appear, and on appeal he asks
that the judgment be affirmed, he acknowledges that the original judgment is correct and the proceedings under the writ of fieri facias are regular so far as he is
concerned. Campbell v. Myers, 16 La. Ann. 362 (1861).
344. First National Bank v. Lagrone, 164 La. 907, 114 So. 832 (1927) ; Copley v. Snow, 3 La. Ann. 623 (1848). See, however, Citizens Bank v. Bringier, 22
La. Ann. 118 (1870).
345. Carman v. Anderson, 15 La. 136 (1840) (suspensive appeal by intervenors in the main demand did not suspend execution of judgment against garnishees).
346. Copley v. Snow, 3 La. Ann. 623 (1848).
347. Hanna's Syndics v. Lauring, 10 Mart.(O.S.) 568 (La. 1822) ; Kimball v.
Plant, 14 La. 511 (1840).
348. See note 347 aupra.
*Now a Member of the Monroe Bar.
1. Two schools of thought exist concerning this attribute of the right. The
"natural law school" holds that eminent domain exists simply as another example
of the superior right of the state over private property. The second school proposes that the right exists as a necessity of government. Both recognize that it
need not be constitutionally created. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 13 (3d ed.
1950). In this particular see also JAHE, EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1953) and 29 C.J.S.,
Eminent Domain § 2 (1941).

